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CHANGES in international competition in the past decade, and particularly 
the competitive  problems of once-dominant  U.S.  firms and industries, 
have  heightened  interest  in what  causes  international  differences  in 
productivity and product quality. Although analysis of macroeconomic 
data has produced some important insights, recent research has focused 
increasingly  on  the  comparative  behavior  of  industries,  firms,  and 
factories. 1 Such research raises in a direct way the issue of management 
efficiency.  Especially  at the factory level,  a growing body of evidence 
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1. For an eclectic survey of microeconomic  productivity  research see Richard  R. 
Nelson, "Research  on Productivity  Growth  and  Productivity  Differences:  Dead  Ends  and 
New Departures,"  Journal  of Economic  Literature,  vol. 19 (September  1981),  pp. 1029- 
64. Recent  examples  would  include  Robert  H. Hayes and Kim B. Clark,  "Exploring  the 
Sources  of Productivity  Differences  at the Factory  Level," in Kim B. Clark,  Robert  H. 
Hayes,  and Christopher Lorenz,  eds.,  The Uneasy Alliance: Managing  the Productivity- 
Technology  Dilemma  (Harvard  Business  School  Press, 1985),  pp. 151-88;  Bernard  Eugene 
Ichniowski, "How Do Labor Relations Matter?  A Study of Productivity  in Eleven 
Manufacturing  Plants"  (Ph.D.  dissertation,  Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology,  1983); 
and  Benjamin  Klotz, Rey Madoo,  and  Reed Hansen, "A Study  of High  and Low 'Labor 
Productivity'  Establishments  in U.S. Manufacturing,"  in John  W. Kendrick  and  Beatrice 
N. Vaccara, New Developments  in Productivity Measurement  and Analysis  (University 
of Chicago  Press  for the National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  1980),  pp. 239-86. 
729 730  Brookings Paipers on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
indicates that international  differences in internal operations-most 
notably quality control and inventories-are  important  in explaining 
variations  in productivity  in a number  of industries.2 
In contrast  to the work  on productivity  in plants, there  has been little 
empirical  work  on the relative  performance  of international  competitors 
in the introduction  of new products.3  Yet theory  and  empirical  evidence 
suggest  that such differences  may be crucial  to competitiveness. In the 
auto industry,  for example, product  development  accounts for a large 
part  of total investment  in research  and development  and represents  a 
substantial  commitment  of resources.4  In 1986,  R&D investment  in the 
United States alone amounted  to $6.25 billion, much of it devoted to 
product development.5  Of course, the effect of R&D on a business 
extends far beyond costs. Advances in technology and product  perfor- 
mance enter the marketplace  through  new products. Product  develop- 
ment  thus affects customer  choice and manufacturing,  with consequent 
effects on productivity,  quality,  and  market  share. 
In an industry  such as automobiles,  in which products  are differen- 
tiated and scale and learning  effects are important  to production, the 
timely  introduction  of a successful  new  product  may  yield  gains  in  market 
share,  profit  margins,  and productivity:  the history  of the auto industry 
is replete with such examples.6  And the stakes are not trivial. In the 
2. Notable discussions include David A. Garvin, "Quality  on the Line," Harvard 
Business Review, vol. 61 (September-October  1983),  pp. 64-75; Robert  W. Hall, Zero 
Inventories  (Homewood,  Ill.: Dow Jones-Irwin,  1983);  Robert  H. Hayes, "Why  Japanese 
Factories  Work," Harvard Business  Reviewv,  vol.  59 (July-August  1981), pp. 56-66;  and 
Richard J. Schonberger, Japanese  Manufacturing  Techiniques: Nine Hidden Lessons  in 
Simplicity  (Free  Press, 1982). 
3. While  much  has  been  written  about  research  and  development  projects,  little  of this 
research  explores international  differences  in development  at anything  but a macroeco- 
nomic level. A recent exception is Hirotaka  Takeuchi  and Ikujiro  Nonaka, "The New 
New Product  Development  Game,"  HarvardBusiness  Review,  vol. 64  (January-February 
1986),  pp. 137-46. 
4.  Private  development  represents  the bulk of R&D expenditures.  Development's 
share  of R&D  in the United  States  may  riun  as high  as 70 percent. 
5.  National Science Foundation, Resear-ch and Development  in Industiy Annual,  1985 
(GPO,  1987). 
6. Product  development  costs and  a design's  manufacturability  will affect production 
costs. The marketability  of the design  will affect  margins  and  unit  sales, and  the project's 
completion  date will influence  the timing  and number  of periods  of sale. Together  these 
factors  have an impact  on market  share,  profitability,  and  productivity.  For details  on the 
enormous  effect of the Model T on Ford, for instance, see William  Abernathy, The Kim B.  Clark, W. Bruce Chew, and Takahiro Fujirnoto  731 
United  States  alone, a single  percentage  point  of market  share  amounted 
to 114,526  units in 1986.  Such volumes have significant  implications  for 
costs and  profits.7 
In addition  to changes in volume, product  development  may affect 
productivity  through  changes in design, and product  designs may have 
an important  effect on yields and costs in production.8  Mundane  issues 
like the selection of a fastener  or the shape of a plastic piece affect the 
number  of parts,  the ease of assembly,  and  hence the cost of the product. 
In addition,  the ability  to exploit  the potential  for automation  in process- 
ing often depends  on the design  of the product. 
The impact of new products on costs, productivity, and customer 
choice suggests  that  product  development  may have important  compet- 
itive implications.  Yet, if product designs could be changed instanta- 
neously at low cost, the competitive  impact  of a new product  would be 
sharply  reduced. Thus what gives product development the power to 
affect competition is the long life of the designs. Depending on the 
product,  changing  from  one design to another  entails significant  adjust- 
ment costs and time. Moreover, the organizational  capabilities that 
determine  the time and costs required-the engineering  know-how, the 
procedures  and  information  systems-are  even longer-lived  assets with 
significant  costs  of adjustment. In an industry such as automobile 
manufacturing,  the life of a given design is measured  in years while the 
life of a development  organization  may be measured  in decades. 
Productivity  Dilemma:  Roadblock  to  Innovation  in  the  Automobile  Industry  (Johns 
Hopkins  University  Press, 1978).  The more  recent  effect of the Taurus/Sable  auto  on Ford 
has been discussed  in a number  of articles,  including  James  B. Treece and others, "Can 
Ford  Stay  on Top?"  Business Week  (September  28, 1987),  pp. 78-86. 
7. For market  size see Harry  A. Stark,  " 1986  Review/Preview,  " Ward's  Automotive 
Yearbook,  1986  (Detroit:  Ward's  Communications,  1987),  p. 13.  For  a  discussion  of volume 
and marginal  costs see Clifford  Winston  and associates, Blind Intersection  (Brookings, 
1987),  chap. 2. There is also a significant  impact  if designs are late. A very successful 
vehicle  may  generate  gross  revenues  of $7.5  billion  over its life (five  years,  200,000  units  a 
year at a wholesale price of $7,500). Discounted  at 10 percent (chosen arbitrarily  for 
illustration),  this  means  $6 billion.  Simply  putting  off this  revenue  by four  months  because 
a project  is late  would  discount  the present  value  by almost  $200  million.  This  figure  is high 
since it represents  revenues  rather  than  profits,  but with most of the labor  and  capital  in 
place  at the planned  launch  date, the lost profits  would  be perhaps  as high  as 60 percent  of 
the $200  million,  or nearly  $1 million  lost for every day the project  is delayed. 
8. For an overview of literature  on "designing  for manufacturing,"  see G. Shirley, 
"The Management  of Manufacturing  Flexibility:  Studies in the Design Manufacturing 
Interface"  (Ph.D.  dissertation,  Harvard  University,  1987). 732  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
Of course, if the manufacturers  are similar and decisions on new 
products  subject  to some degree  of coordination,  product  development 
may not be a central  feature  of competition  and may have less effect on 
productivity. But the success of innovative Japanese and European 
products  and the mixed record  of U.S. competitors  in various markets 
suggest  that  performance  in product  development  may be important  for 
competitiveness.9  The truth of this observation is buttressed by the 
growing fragmentation  of markets, the proliferation  of new products, 
and the increased  attention  placed on product  development  by senior 
executives throughout  the world.  10 
This paper  presents  the initial  results of a study of product  develop- 
ment in the world  auto industry  using data on passenger  vehicle devel- 
opment  projects  from  twenty automobile  companies  in Japan,  Europe, 
and the United States. We first characterize  and quantify  differences 
among projects in engineering  hours and lead time and then explain 
those differences  in terms  of the scope and  complexity  of the project  and 
the way it was organized  and managed. 
A Model of Product Development 
The unit  of analysis  in this study is the product  development  project. 
New products may simply be those incorporating  minor changes to 
established  designs (for example, a washing machine with an almond 
9.  Foreign  entrants  to U.S. markets  have repeatedly  forced  established  companies  to 
counterattack  by developing  new products  or else lose their  competitive  positions.  This 
pattern  has been seen in the manufacture  of radio receivers, automobiles,  plain paper 
copiers,  and  ceramic  packaging  for integrated  circuits,  to name  just a few. In recent  years 
the Japanese  have played the most dramatic  role as new entrants;  see Kim B. Clark, 
"Managing  Technology  in International  Competition:  The Case of Product  Development 
in Response to Foreign  Entry," in A. Michael  Spence and Heather  A. Hazard,  eds., 
International Competitiveness (Ballinger,  1988),  pp. 27-74. 
10. Our data suggest that the total number  of vehicle designs has increased in all 
regional  markets.  Given  the slow growth  of these markets,  such proliferation  has led to 
reduced volumes per vehicle design, increasing the importance  of efficient product 
development;  see Jeffrey  Miller,  Jinchiro  Nokane, and  Thomas  Vollmann,  "The Global 
Manufacturing  Futures Survey," Manufacturing  Roundtable  Research Report series 
(Boston University  School  of Management,  1983). Kim B.  Clark, W. Bruce  Chew, and Takahiro Fujimoto  733 
cabinet  instead  of a white  one), or they may  use new technology  to create 
new markets  (the Xerox 914 copier). This study examines new models 
of an  established  product  in  a market  in which  the firm  already  competes. 
But the models may represent  an attempt  to define a new niche within 
that market  and may involve innovation  in components and systems. 
Product  development  of this kind  is not research;  there  is no theoretical 
question  to be explored  and  little  uncertainty  about  technical  feasibility. 
There is uncertainty  in development,  but it concerns the specific form 
the product  will take, the degree of performance  it will achieve, and its 
acceptance  in the market. 
We use the idea of information  processing  to organize  the analysis." 
In this context product  development  comprises  activities that translate 
knowledge  of market  needs and technological  opportunities  into infor- 
mation for production. The information  includes product concepts, 
styling models, specifications,  layouts, prototypes, engineering  draw- 
ings, process designs, tools and dies, equipment, and software. The 
product  itself is thus a bundle  of information  embodied  in materials. 
THE  PRODUCT  DEVELOPMENT  PROCESS 
Product  development  constitutes  a complex set of activities  involving 
many  people for long periods. To give some structure  to the problem  of 
evaluating  the development  process, we developed  a simple  model. Our 
starting  point was the assumption that development occurs through 
problem-solving  cycles carried  out by engineers  who attempt  to optimize 
a number  of different  performance  parameters  in an uncertain  environ- 
ment. The engineers begin with broad objectives determined  through 
long-range  planning.  The objectives generally  define  the target  market, 
including  price  range,  performance  parameters,  customers,  and  relation- 
ships to other  products.  Given these objectives, project  performance  is 
measured  by the quality  of the design and its manufacturability  as well 
11. Information  processing  has  been widely  used as a way of organizing  thought  about 
innovation;  see, for example,  Sumner  Meyers  and  Donald  Marquis,  Successful  Indlustrial 
Innovations  (National  Science Foundation,  1969).  For a fuller  discussion  of the informa- 
tion-processing  model of auto product  development, see Kim B. Clark  and Takahiro 
Fujimoto, "Overlapping  Problem Solving in Product Development," working paper 
87-048  (Harvard  Business  School, Division  of Research,  1987). 734  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
as development  costs and  lead  time.  12  Defined  in these terms,  the project 
engineers' objective is to meet quality and manufacturability  require- 
ments while minimizing  cost and lead time. This is no small challenge, 
especially since for a given level of quality  there appears  to be a trade- 
off between expected cost and  expected lead time.  13 
In our framework,  there are four major  activities in product devel- 
opment: concept generation, product planning, product engineering, 
and production engineering.14 In each, information  from a previous 
activity is used to create new information  for a subsequent  activity. 
Each activity can be divided  into a hierarchy  of tasks, subtasks, and 
sub-subtasks.  At the base of the hierarchy  is the set of activities, the unit 
tasks, beyond  which  further  decomposition  is not attempted.  In product 
development  there are two types of unit tasks: engineering  and coordi- 
nation. The times required  for completing  a unit engineering  task and a 
12. Quality  includes  both technical  parameters  that define  the class of vehicle (size, 
degree  of luxury,  weight)  and  its marketability  (ride,  handling,  aesthetics)  as perceived  by 
the auto purchaser.  Manufacturability  refers  to the quality  of the design  as perceived  by 
the factory  that  will produce  the vehicle. In this sense the factory  is another  customer  of 
the  development  group.  Cost  refers  to the  resources  consumed  in  development,  not  vehicle 
unit cost. Lead time is the time elapsed  from  the start  of work  on the product  concept to 
market  introduction.  By some  definitions,  the technical,  marketability,  and  even manufac- 
turability  dimensions  are all subcategories  of quality.  For more  on the subject  of product 
quality  as a performance  parameter  see David  A. Garvin,  "What  Does 'Product  Quality' 
Really Mean?" Sloan Management Review, vol. 26 (Fall 1984), pp. 25-43. 
13. The notion  of a convex time-cost  trade-off  has been explored  both  theoretically  in 
F. M. Scherer,  "Time-Cost  Tradeoffs  in Uncertain  Empirical  Research  Projects,"  Naval 
Research  Logistics Quarterly,  vol. 13  (March  1966),  pp. 71-82, and  empirically  in Edwin 
Mansfield  and others,  Research  and Innovation  in the Modern  Corporation  (Norton, 
1971). 
14. Concept  generation  occurs when information  on customer  needs or problems  is 
translated  into a written  statement  of the product  concept. Product  planning  occurs  when 
detailed  targets  for  performance,  cost, and  styling  are  developed  from  the  product  concept. 
Styling  is expressed  by clay or plastic  models;  the other targets  are written  documents. 
Performance  includes not only technical goals such as weight and horsepower but 
marketability  goals such as ride  and handling.  Product  engineering  occurs when product 
targets  are  translated  into  a set of detailed  engineering  drawings.  The  drawings  are  backed 
by engineering  prototypes  and  computer-assisted  design  data  files. Production  engineering 
occurs when engineering  drawings  are translated  into a process design  at various  levels, 
such  as process  flow  charts  and  plant  layout,  tool and  equipment  design,  work  design,  and 
parts  programming.  The process  design  information  is then  transferred  to actual  elements 
of the production  process, such as tools, equipment,  and  operator  skills, using  pilot  runs 
and  start-up  activities  in the factory. Kim B.  Clark, W. Bruce Chew, and Takahiro Flijinoto  735 
unit coordination  task may be called unit engineering  time and unit 
coordination  time. Given the project's organizational  structure,  these 
times will depend  on the capabilities  of the engineers  and the ability  of 
the development  organization  to process information.  Unit times are, of 
course, not predictable  with certainty. 
Given  staffing  levels, the sum  of the times  actually  required  to perform 
the unit  activities  determines  the total  number  of engineering  hours  used 
in the project.  However, the project's  duration,  which we will call lead 
time, is not a simple function of the number of unit tasks and their 
duration.  The elapsed  time will also be affected  by the way in which  the 
unit  tasks  are  interrelated.  They  may  be executed  in  parallel,  in sequence, 
or may  be partially  overlapped  to form  the total  project  system. Whether 
the tasks can be carried  out in parallel  depends on their nature  and the 
problem-solving  capabilities  of the organization.  15 
A certain  subset  of the unit  tasks constitutes  what  has been called the 
project system's critical path.'6 Any time added to the critical path 
through additional sequential tasks or increased unit engineering  or 
coordination  time will delay the project's completion. Noncritical  par- 
allel paths will also exist. These paths have slack time; time added to 
them will not delay the project's completion  unless so much is added 
that  the slack  time is eliminated  and  the path  becomes critical. 
The presence  of both critical  and  noncritical  sets of tasks implies  that 
there  will be no simple  one-to-one correspondence  between changes in 
task duration  and  lead time. An extra week required  to complete a task 
on the critical  path will delay a project's completion  by one week. An 
extra week required  to complete a task on a noncritical  path will not 
delay the project's  completion  unless there is less than a week of slack 
time. Thus the sequencing  and parallelism  or, more broadly,  the inter- 
15. For more on overlap in product  design see Clark  and Fujimoto,  "Overlapping 
Problem Solving"; and Mansfield and others, Research  and Innovationi. 
16. Actually,  the uncertainty  about  project  task  durations  suggests  that  analysis  using 
the  program  evaluation  and  review  technique  would  be more  accurate.  The  PERT  approach 
is conceptually  identical  to  the  framework  described  here  but  includes  expected,  maximum, 
and minimum  duration  times for each task to give estimates of project  duration.  For a 
survey  of the literature  on PERT  (which  was first  used to accelerate  the development  of 
the Polaris  missile)  see Richard  S. Rosenbloom,  "Notes on the Development  of Network 
Models  for Resource  Allocation  in R&D Projects,"  IEEE Tranisactions on Engineering 
Management  (June  1964),  pp. 58-63. 736  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activyity,  3:1987 
dependence  of activities  will  affect  the  relationship  between  task  duration 
and lead time. 
A project can thus be thought  of as a network of interrelated  engi- 
neering  and coordination  activities of uncertain  duration.  The number 
and  duration  of activities  will determine  the total number  of engineering 
hours the project will consume. The duration  and interdependence  of 
activities will determine  lead time. 
PROJECT  STRATEGY:  COMPLEXITY  AND  SCOPE 
The existence of a critical path suggests that development perfor- 
mance will be affected  by the number  of unit tasks and the complexity 
of their interactions  and by the capability  of the organization  to create 
and  process  information.  The  first  set of variables  we call  project  strategy; 
the second, project  organization.  17  The strategy  of a project  is defined  in 
the first instance by the choice of market  and the approach  to product 
differentiation.  These choices determine  the extent of technical inno- 
vation  and  of technical  performance  improvement  sought,  both  of which 
influence  the complexity  of engineering  and  coordination  tasks. 
The second element  of project  strategy  is the project's scope. While 
the choice of market  and mode of differentiation  determine  the engi- 
neering  tasks, the scope of the project  determines  which tasks will be 
accomplished  by the project  group.  For any unit  engineering  task, there 
are three possibilities:  the task will be performed  by the project  group, 
it will be performed  by another organization,  or it has already been 
performed. In setting project strategy the engineers may choose to 
involve outside suppliers  in engineering  work; this shifts engineering 
hours outside the project  and may affect lead time. The engineers  may 
also choose to use parts  developed for earlier  models or other current 
models; this too eliminates engineering  hours and, to the extent that 
such parts  are  on the critical  path, may  also reduce  lead  time. Of  course, 
the use of suppliers  and  existing  parts  may  create  additional  coordination 
tasks that  offset changes  in unit  engineering  time. 
17. While there are significant  differences in scope, nomenclature,  and industry- 
specific variables,  this work is similar  in spirit  to Mansfield  and others, Researchl and 
Innovation,  which  investigated  the determinants  of development  costs and  lead times  for 
a set of new ethical  drugs. Kim B.  Clark, W. Bruce Chew, and Takahiro Fijirnoto  737 
PROJECT  ORGANIZATION:  INTEGRATION,  SPECIALIZATION, 
AND  PROBLEM  SOLVING 
The  project's  strategy  determines  the  number of  unit engineering 
tasks and the complexity of interactions.  But the length of a unit task, 
the extent of parallel  processing, and the incidence of mistakes and 
iterations will be affected by the way the engineering  group solves 
problems.  At each stage of the development  process the engineers  are 
presented with objectives and alternative  ways of meeting them. Al- 
though  some alternatives  are  well defined  and  some choices are  obvious, 
many objectives  cannot  be met with obvious  alternatives.  When this 
happens,  the engineers  have a problem,  and the problem-solving  cycle 
begins, generating  more  unit  tasks. 
In our  framework,  problem  solving  involves a search  for alternatives 
and a procedure  for testing them to find one that provides a solution. 
Cycles of problem solving occur on a small scale, such as the work of an 
individual  engineer  or a small engineering  group, and on a large scale, 
such as the work of an entire department.  There are five steps to the 
process: setting  goals, generating  alternatives,  building  models, testing, 
and selection.18 At the engineering  stage of a car development  project, 
for example, problem  solving begins once product  planning  establishes 
performance  specifications and styling objectives; these become the 
goals of product  engineering  (step 1). Product  engineers  then generate 
alternative  drawings  (step 2) and build  prototypes  (step 3). To gauge  the 
extent  to which  the  design  meets  objectives,  engineers  test the  prototypes 
on proving  grounds  or in laboratories  (step 4). At this point the process 
may cycle again-more  drawings, prototypes, testing-until  the best 
possible design, according to the test results, is chosen (step 5).19 
Because each iteration  generates  more unit tasks, effective problem 
solving (fewer iterations) should reduce engineering hours and, if the 
activities  are  potentially  on the critical  path,  lead  time.  The  effectiveness 
of problem  solving  depends  on two closely related  aspects of organiza- 
tion. The first  is the overall structure  of the development  organization, 
18. This framework  is a modified  version  of the approach  developed  by Richard  M. 
Cyert  and  James  G. March,  A Behav,ioral Theoty of the Fir-m  (Prentice-Hall,  1963). 
19. For a richer  description  of problem  solving  in the auto design process see Clark 
and  Fujimoto,  "Overlapping  Problem  Solving." 738  Brookings Paper-s on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
which includes the pattern  of specialization  and the methods used for 
integration.  Specialization  affects the expertise  of the engineers  as well 
as the kinds  of problems  they see and the data  they have to solve them. 
Different  methods  of integration  (committees,  rules, and  so forth)  affect 
the time required  for coordination  and the quality of information  that 
flows across lines of specialization. 
The second organizational  element is the way in which problem- 
solving  cycles in adjacent  engineering  tasks are  linked.  The timing  of the 
tasks and the pattern of communication  between them may affect 
performance.  For example, an open, reciprocal  flow of information  in 
combination  with parallel  processing of tasks may reduce lead time. 
Engineering  hours may also be affected if the communication  system 
eliminates  mistakes  and  additional  work. However, executing  activities 
in parallel  in the face of significant  uncertainty  may lead to dead ends 
and  mistakes  even if communication  is excellent. This suggests  that  both 
project  strategy  and  project  organization  (and  the fit  between  them)  may 
have an important  influence  on project  performance. 
Research Design and Basic Data 
Any study of the development process faces several problems in 
acquiring  data. Publicly available information  on R&D either is not 
project-specific  or does not provide evidence on the outcomes of the 
development  process  or the operating  characteristics  of the firm.  A study 
of this kind  thus requires  collection of data  in the field. Given our desire 
to link  product  development  and  international  competition,  we faced the 
additional  requirement  that  the data  cover worldwide  competitors  in an 
industry  where  product  development  seemed important.  To meet these 
requirements,  we focused the study on the major competitors in the 
world auto industry. The industry is large and important  in Japan, 
Europe, and the United States; competition  occurs on a global scale. 
Product development is important  in that competition, and we had 
developed relationships  and expertise in the industry  through  previous 
research. 
The  unit  of analysis  in the study  was a major  car  development  project: 
development  of an entirely  new model  or a major  model  change  in which 
over half the parts were newly designed. Three U.S.,  eight Japanese, Kim B.  Clark, W. Bruce Chew, and Takahiro Fuijitnoto  739 
and nine European  auto companies  participated  in the research. From 
these companies  we collected data on twenty-nine  projects: six in the 
United States, twelve in Japan, and eleven in Europe.20  The models 
developed included sedans, micro-mini  cars, and small vans. Model 
introduction  dates  ranged  from 1980  to 1987,  with suggested  retail  prices 
from  $4,300  to more  than  $40,000.21 
We developed three kinds of evidence: quantitative  data on the 
characteristics  of the project  (its scope and complexity)  and its perfor- 
mance;  documentary  materials  on the development  process, including 
internal  reports, organization  charts, memoranda,  and published  arti- 
cles; and  the experience  of key participants  in the project.  In addition  to 
the documentary  evidence, the experience of participants  was our 
primary  source  on the internal  operation  of the project. 
We relied on interviews and questionnaires  to collect the data. We 
distributed  questionnaires  to key project  members  in each development 
project.  To make  the questions  as relevant  and sensible as possible, we 
tested pilot surveys at selected companies.  The questionnaires  focused 
on project  characteristics  and performance  but also included  questions 
about the development process-its  organization,  the role of project 
managers,  and  modes of problem  solving. 
We followed the questionnaires  with interviews  of key participants, 
including  project  managers,  heads of R&D groups, engineering  admin- 
istration  staff,  and  other  product  and  process  engineers.  In  the interviews 
we asked  not only about  the project  but  about  R&D  within  the company 
as a whole. We conducted  both  unstructured  and structured  interviews, 
20. Geographic  references  refer  to the region  in which  the product  was developed,  not 
the home  country  of the parent  company.  Products  developed  by Opel, for example,  are 
classed  as European  though  Opel  is owned  by General  Motors. 
21. To gain cooperation,  we allowed  firms  to select the project  to be studied.  There 
was a clear  tendency  to select a project  which,  in the firm's  opinion,  was successful.  As a 
result,  these  projects  may  most  accurately  be thought  of as best practice  by each  company. 
Because the unit of analysis was the completed project, the data did not reflect the 
performance  of the firm's  development  activity  as a whole. A firm's  overall  development 
performance  may  be affected  by economies  of scope, and some projects  may  be stopped 
before  completion.  One must  be careful  in extrapolating  the results  reported  here to the 
whole  firm.  However,  scope and  premature  termination  of projects  were unlikely  to bias 
inferences  about  individual  projects  in this sample.  There  was little  relationship  between 
size  of firm,  forexample  (total  sales, numberof  models),  and  project  performance.  Further, 
in the auto industry,  major  development  projects  tend to be completed  once they are 
launched.  Those that are killed tend to be killed very early in the planning  process; 
dropping  a project  after  it has been approved  and  engineering  work  has begun  is rare. 740  Br-ookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
the former  for getting  a feel for the process and generating  hypotheses, 
the latter  for  confirming  hypotheses  qualitatively  on a comparative  basis. 
A format  was prepared  for structured  interviews  to acquire  qualitative 
yet comparative  information  among  projects. 
In collecting  the data  and  in conducting  analyses we used the quanti- 
tative  information,  documentary  evidence, and  interviews  interactively. 
When  anomalies  or inconsistencies  turned  up in one source, we turned 
to other sources to shed light on the problem. We consistently played 
back  to the participants  the information  received  to ensure  accuracy  and 
understanding.  This interaction involved not only raw data but the 
concepts behind our questions. Interaction  turned  out to be our most 
important  method  of checking  construct  validity;  on numerous  occasions 
participants  suggested  alternative  questions that provided  much better 
information. 
BASIC  DATA 
This paper  focuses on explaining  differences  among  projects  in lead 
time and total hours expended by engineers in product  engineering.22 
We  attempted  to control  for  differences  in quality  and  manufacturability, 
but  analysis  of the determinants  of those dimensions  is outside  the scope 
of the paper.23  Table 1 presents summary  data on lead time and engi- 
neering hours, along with information  on project strategy, including 
variables  measuring  the complexity  of the product  and the scope of the 
project. The table indicates that Japanese  projects were completed in 
two-thirds  the time  and  with one-third  the engineering  hours  of the non- 
Japanese  projects. In absolute terms, the Japanese  used an average  of 
2 million  fewer  engineering  hours  and  typically  completed  a project  more 
22. The focus on product  engineering  was dictated  by the data:  all firms  in the sample 
had  data  on product  engineering,  but  very  few were  organized  to track  process  engineering 
hours. This was true in all countries  in the sample. Our discussions with engineering 
managers  about  this  issue, however,  suggested  that  product  and  process  engineering  hours 
were positively correlated.  Thus we expect that the data on product  engineering  hours 
provide an indication  of what the overall productivity  analysis would show, but that 
assumption  needs to be tested  in further  work. 
23. Work  is under  way in the project  to collect data  on product  quality  and manufac- 
turability.  As noted  later,  our  preliminary  analysis  suggested  that,  at least as far  as cross- 
country  comparisons  are  concerned,  the absence  of good data  may  actually  have led us to 
understate  the Japanese  advantage.  We shall  examine  this issue in further  work. Kim B.  Clark, W. Brlce  Chew, and Takahiro Fijiimoto  741 
Table 1.  Selected Data on Automotive Projects, by Region 
United 
Variablea  Total  Japan  States  Eursope 
Number  of projects  29  12  6  11 
Year of introduction  1980-87  1981-85  1984-87  1980-87 
Engineering hours (thousands) 
Average  2,577  1,155  3,478  3,636 
Minimum  426  426  1,041  700 
Maximum  7,000  2,000  7,000  6,545 
Lead time (months) 
Average  54.2  42.6  61.9  62.6 
Minimum  35.0  35.0  50.2  46.0 
Maximum  97.0  51.0  77.0  97.0 
Average  price (1987 dollars)  13,591  9,238  13,193  19,720 
Body  size  (percent of projects) 
Micro-mini  10  25  0  0 
Small  56  67  17  64 
Medium to large  34  8  83  36 
Average  number of body types  2.1  2.3  1.7  2.2 
Project scope  indicators (average) 
Ratio of common  parts 
(percent)  19  12  29  21 
Ratio of carryover parts 
(percent)  10  7  9  14 
Ratio of unique parts 
(percent)  74  82  62  71 
Share in parts procurement costs 
(percent) 
Supplier proprietary parts  7  8  3  7 
Black box parts  44  62  16  39 
Detail-controlled  parts  49  30  81  54 
Source:  Authors'  survey calculations. 
a.  Definitions of variables:  Year of initrodiuctioni:  calendar year when the first version  of the model was introduced 
to the market. Eniginieering  hours: hours spent directly on the project in question  by the engineers,  technicians,  and 
other employees  at the company.  Suppliers' engineering hours are excluded,  except  when total vehicle-development 
works are subcontracted  out  under some  consignment  arrangement.  Engineering  hours of overhead  are excluded. 
Concept generation, product planning, and product engineering are included; process engineering is excluded.  Figures 
include  neither engine  nor transmission  development  except  modification  works  for matching  them  with the  total 
vehicle.  Lead  time: time elapsed  from start of the development  project to market introduction.  Start of the project 
means start of organizational activities  for product concept  generation. Price: average suggested  retail price of major 
versions  in each model.  U.S.  1987 retail prices are used  wherever  possible.  Prices  of models  not sold in the United 
States  are estimated  by applying the  relative  price  of  some  global  models  to the  global  models'  U.S.  price.  Body 
size:  micro-mini models  typically  have  0.55  liter engines  and are  sold  mostly  in Japan.  Medium-to-large  models 
typically  have  a  wheelbase  of  105 inches  or  more.  Small  models,  often  called  compact  and  subcompact,  are  in 
between.  Other than the above  criteria, industry practices  of size  segmentations  are also  applied.  Nimlnber  of body 
types: number of body types  significantly different from each other in number of doors,  side silhouette,  and so on. 
Comnmtoni  parts ratio: fraction of parts in common  with other existing  models  at the company,  based on number of 
parts drawings.  Carryover parts  ratio:  fraction  of  parts carried over  from previous  model,  in terms of  number of 
parts drawings.  Unique pairts ratio: fraction of parts developed  for the model  in question.  Measures  as  one  minus 
common parts ratio minus carryover parts ratio, with double counting between  the two taken into account.  Suipplier 
proprietaiy  parts:  parts developed  entirely  by  parts suppliers  as  their  standard products.  Black  box parts:  parts 
whose  basic  engineering  is  done  by  automakers,  while  detailed  engineering  is  done  by  parts  suppliers.  Detail- 
cotitrolled parts: parts developed  enirely by car makers from basic to detailed  engineering. 742  Brookinigs Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
than a year and a half earlier.24  These differences have significant 
implications  in an industry in which engineers may be a constrained 
resource, a model's life may be only four to five years, and market 
demands  are continually  changing.25 
The  data  in  table  1  suggest  that  part  of the  apparent  Japanese  advantage 
may be due to differences  in the type of vehicles being designed. The 
price  and  size distribution  data  indicate  Japanese  cars  were less complex 
on average than European or U.S.  vehicles. The Japanese projects 
studied  include  three micro-mini  cars, which brought  the average  price 
down significantly.  But price is not simply  a surrogate  for vehicle size; 
it may also reflect the level of luxury, performance,  and quality. This 
seems to be at work  in  the U.S .-European  differences.  The U. S. vehicles 
were predominantly  medium  to large  size, while the European  vehicles 
were predominantly  small;  yet the average  European  price was almost 
50 percent  higher. 
In addition  to differences  in the complexity of the products, table 1 
shows significant  differences  in the role of suppliers.  The  Japanese  make 
extensive use of proprietary  and black box parts, particularly  when 
compared  with their U.S. competitors.  The Europeans  make some use 
of black box parts, but the U.S. mode of development  relies heavily on 
detailed  control  of parts  engineering.  This  implies  that  the  Japanese  draw 
more  engineering  resources  from  parts  suppliers. 
One  might  infer  from  table 1  that  the Japanese  performance  advantage 
was overstated because the Japanese projects were, on average, less 
complex and narrower  in scope. However, the data also show that the 
unique parts ratio was higher in the average Japanese project. U.S. 
projects  used approximately  twice the number  of common  and  carryover 
parts, and the average Japanese project developed more body types. 
Thus while the evidence suggested that correcting  for differences in 
project  strategy  would  reduce  the Japanese  advantage,  the magnitude  of 
the adjustment  was not clear. It is to that  issue that  we now turn. 
24. The  micro-mini  cars  are  unique  to Japan.  Dropping  them  from  the sample  adds  less 
than  200,000  engineering  hours  and only one month  to the mean  values for the Japanese 
projects. 
25. For evidence  on market  demands  and  more  detailed  discussion  of recent  industry 
dynamics, see William  J. Abernathy,  Kim B. Clark,  and Alan M. Kantiow, Indlustrial 
Renaissance:  Prodlucing a  CompetitiNe Fuitlure  for  America  (Basic  Books,  1983); and 
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Strategy and Performance 
The two dimensions  of project  strategy,  scope and  complexity,  affect 
the number  of unit  tasks in a project  and  the nature  of their  interactions. 
As discussed  earlier,  some differences  in strategy  (supplier  participation 
and carryover  and common  parts)  have a direct impact  on engineering 
hours, while others depend on the nature of the tasks and how the 
organization  handles them. Thus in the analysis that follows we use 
direct  adjustment  of the raw  engineering  hours  data  as well as statistical 
analysis  to gauge  the impact  of project  strategy. 
ENGINEERING  HOURS,  SCOPE,  AND  COMPLEXITY 
The first step in our analysis of engineering hours was to adjust 
reported  hours  for differences  in the scope of the project.  Because parts 
suppliers do some engineering  and because some projects use parts 
developed  in other  projects,  the engineering  hours  reported  in table 1 do 
not measure  the total engineering  hours required  to develop a vehicle. 
Of course, if all projects  used suppliers  and  nonunique  parts  in the same 
way, the adjustment  would be unnecessary. But the Americans,  Japa- 
nese, and  Europeans  are all different. 
Our approach to adjusting engineering hours is described in the 
Appendix.  In essence we used information  on the role of suppliers  and 
the use of carryover  and common  parts  to estimate  the fraction  of total 
engineering  hours  that  were expended  in-house  by the project  team. We 
then used that  ratio  to scale up the reported  hours. For example, if that 
ratio was 50 percent (the project team accounting  for half of the total 
engineering  hours), we doubled reported  engineering  hours to get an 
adjusted  figure.  The adjusted  data  in table  2 show how many  engineering 
hours  would have been required  to develop the entire vehicle in-house 
with  no carryover  or common  parts.26 
It is clear from  table 2 that adjusting  for differences  in project  scope 
26. We  use the  adjusted  data  because  it is conceptually  the dependent  variable  of most 
relevance  and  interest.  We have run  the engineering  hour  regressions  shown throughout 
this paper  with  unadjusted  hours  as the dependent  variable  and  NH (the "new in-house" 
ratio)  as the  independent  variable  (as in the lead  time  regressions).  The  qualitative  findings 
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Table 2.  Engineering Hours Adjusted for Project Scope 
A verage  Noni-niqiue  Supplier 
Average  adjlusted  parts  designi 
engineer-ing  engineer ing  percentage  percentage 
hoiurs  hoiurs  of adjuisted  of adjlusted 
Sample  set  (thlolusands)  (thouisands)  holurs  hoIuIIrs 
Total  2,577  4,567  26  38 
Japan  1,155  2,701  18  52 
United  States  3,478  4,892  38  15 
Europe  3,636  6,426  29  35 
Source:  See  Appendix  for  definitions  and  computation  of  adjustment.  Adjtisted  figures  are  uniformly  greater 
because  they  reflect the total hours that would have  been  required if no supplier design  work had been performed 
and all vehicle  parts were unique. 
changed  the pattern  of hours. The greater  dependence on suppliers  in 
the Japanese  projects indicated  by the supplier  design percentage  re- 
sulted in a significant  increase in engineering  hours after adjustment. 
The U.S. and European  hours  also increased,  but the relative  Japanese 
advantage  narrowed  substantially;  the U.S.-Japan ratio went from 3:1 
in the unadjusted  data  to 1.8:1  after  adjustment;  the Europe-Japan  ratio 
fell from  3. 1:1  to 2.4:1. As the ratios  imply, the adjustment  also created 
a gap between U.S.  and European engineering hours. The greater 
supplier  dependence in the European  projects resulted in an average 
increase of 77 percent, while the comparable U.S.  average was 41 
percent. 
While the Japanese advantage  had narrowed  in percentage terms, 
there remained  a significant  difference  in performance  to be explained. 
On an absolute  basis the U.S.-Japan difference  fell only slightly, while 
the Europe-Japan  difference  increased  from roughly  2.5 million  hours 
to 3.7 million  hours  after adjustment.  Some part of the difference  may 
have been due to differences  in the products developed. The projects 
studied ranged from very small (engine less than 1 liter), relatively 
simple, four-passenger  micro-mini  cars to large, complex, high-perfor- 
mance luxury  sedans. Such programs  are likely to differ  in the number 
of parts and systems that must be designed, the amount of testing 
required,  and the number  of alternatives  examined. Other  things  being 
equal, one would expect more complex projects to require  more engi- 
neering  hours. 
We used three variables  to control  for project  content: size class of 
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parts structure  in different  sizes of automobiles  have shown that small 
cars typically  have many  fewer parts. This reflects  the requirements  of 
cost and the prevalence  of automation  in the manufacture  of small cars 
produced  in high volume. But it also reflects a lower level of absolute 
performance  in ride, handling,  and  power. 
While  vehicle size may  capture  broad  differences  in complexity,  even 
within a size class there are likely to be substantial differences in 
engineering  content. The number of body types is one source. One 
project  may develop four or five different  bodies (two-door,  four-door, 
hatchback,  station  wagon), while another  in the same size class may do 
only one. The impact  on engineering  hours  depends  on the design  of the 
base vehicle, but a common rule of thumb  in the industry  is that each 
additional  body type adds 10 to 20 percent to the hours necessary to 
design  the base vehicle. Going  from one to four body types may add as 
much  as 50 percent. 
In addition  to auto size and  body types, engineering  hours  depend  on 
the performance  level that the parts and the systems in the vehicle are 
designed to achieve. The development  of a high-performance  product 
involves more attention  to detail and nuance, higher  precision  in speci- 
fying tolerances, more rigorous  testing, and possibly the development 
of design  concepts that  advance  the state of the art. These activities not 
only require  people and hours but, if successful, also deliver a higher 
level of quality  to the market  and  thus  command  a higher  price. Although 
the  price  of a vehicle is affected  by things  other  than  engineering  content, 
consumers  expect it to provide  some additional  indication  of differences 
in the complexity  of the design and product  quality. We thus expected 
that  the larger  the vehicle was, the more  body types it had, and  the more 
expensive it was, the more  engineering  hours  it required. 
Table 3 presents regressions  of adjusted  engineering  hours on dum- 
mies for vehicle size, the number of body types, vehicle price, and 
region.27  Column  1 gives the simple  mean difference  between Japanese 
projects  and the rest of the sample. Columns  2, 3, and 4 introduce  the 
measures  of complexity  in various  combinations. 
27. As noted  in table 1, our  price  values  were U.S. market  prices  or estimates  of those 
prices  if the vehicle  was not sold in the United  States. To test for problems  due to a U.S. 
pricing  bias, we also collected data on each vehicle's home market  price. Using these 
prices  (expressed  in 1987  dollars)  in the regressions  did  not change  the qualitative  results; 
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Table 3.  Effects of Product Variables on Adjusted Engineering Hoursa 
Engineering  hours 
Independent  variable  1  2  3  4 
Constant  5885  4920  955  2661 
(612)  (606)  (1474)  (1358) 
Body  size 
Micro-mini  ...  -  3564  -  2262  -  1055 
(1526)  (1428)  (1269) 
Large auto  .  .  47.7  . . 
(977.6) 
Body  types  .  ..  .  ..  1086  1038 
(417)  (355) 
Price  ...  ...  0.109  0.062 
(0.050)  (0.045) 
Japan  -3184  . .  .  . ..  -  2608 
(782)  (800) 
Summaty  statistics 
R2  .429  .154  .334  .536 
Standard error  2029  2425  2152  1836 
Degrees  of freedom  27  26  25  24 
Source:  Authors'  calculations.  See  text description. 
a.  Standard errors  in  parentheses.  In this  paper  we  have  reported  on  the  results  of  regressions  in  which  the 
variables have been entered linearly. We have explored  multiplicative forms and found little significant difference  in 
our results and no differences  in our conclusions.  There are arguments for both forms but little theoretical  basis for 
selecting  one instead of the other. 
The controls  for project  complexity  all had  the expected sign, though 
the magnitude  and  the precision  of the effects were mixed. With  respect 
to vehicle size (column 2), there are clear differences in engineering 
content between micro-mini  cars and others, but little estimated  differ- 
ence between large cars and subcompacts  or compacts.28  In column 3 
we added body type and price and found a positive effect: more body 
types and a higher  price were associated with more engineering  hours. 
The  estimates  for  body type accorded  with  rules  of thumb  we discovered 
in our interviews. At the mean level of engineering  hours (4.6 million), 
reducing  the number  of body types from two to one would decrease 
engineering  hours  by 23.6 percent.  To get a similar  effect using  the price 
coefficient,  the price  would have to drop  from  its mean  value of $14,000 
28. In effect, we picked  up a micro-mini  car  influence  rather  than  a size influence.  For 
this  reason  the  dummy  variable  was preferable  to a continuous  variable,  such  as a measure 
of car  length.  In the remaining  engineering  hour  regressions,  only the micro-mini  car size 
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to $4,100,  which is about  the price  of a micro-mini  car. This implies  that 
one-third  of the difference  in  hours  between  micro-minis  and  the average 
vehicle may  be explained  by content  differences  associated  with  vehicle 
price. 
Once we took into account the differences in size, body type, and 
price, the Japanese  advantage  seen in column 1 dropped  by almost 0.6 
million  hours, or about 19  percent  (column  4). Adding  the Japan  dummy 
also reduced  the size and significance  of the price coefficient, although 
the effect of body type was little changed.  Thus, while the character  of 
a  project  accounted  for  some  of the  raw  difference  in  adjusted  engineering 
hours between the Japanese and other producers, a significant  gap 
remained.  The point estimate  in column  4 (2.6 million  hours)  suggested 
that Americans  and Europeans  used about twice as many engineering 
hours  to complete  a project  in the same size class with the same number 
of body types and selling  for the same price as did the Japanese.  Those 
2.6 million hours were the equivalent of one additional  average car 
program  in Japan. 
LEAD  TIME,  SCOPE,  AND  COMPLEXITY 
Differences  in project  strategy  will, by definition,  create differences 
in tasks. While the effect of those differences  will depend on how the 
tasks  are  related  to the critical  path,  we expected  that  adding  tasks  would 
increase  lead  time  .29  Thus  our  measures  of scope and  complexity  should 
have had  a positive effect on lead time. The magnitude  and significance 
of the effect would depend on the possibilities for parallel  processing, 
changes in coordination  requirements,  and the relative efficiency of 
suppliers.30 
Table  4 shows the impact  of project  strategy  on lead time. The mean 
difference  between Japan and the other regions (a time advantage  of 
29. See Rosenbloom,  "Notes on the Development  of Network  Models." 
30. The  critical  path  model  discussed  earlier  suggests  that  changes  in tasks  affect  lead 
time only if the tasks are on critical  or near-critical  paths. If tasks can be processed in 
parallel,  they are less likely to appear  on the critical  path. Adding  more  parts  in need of 
engineering  (increased  unique  parts  ratio  or reduced  supplier  percentage  or both) to the 
project  may  influence  the critical  path  if the tasks will take  longer  in-house  as opposed  to 
the  length  of time  they  would  take  suppliers  or  the  need  for  coordination  activities  changes. 
Because  of these  factors,  the  full  effect  of changes  in project  scope  on lead  time  is uncertain 
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Table 4.  Combined Effects of Unique Parts and Supplier-Engineered Parts on Lead Timea 
Lead  time 
Indepenidenit  variable  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Constant  62.5  51.5  45.6  20.2  35.8  39.5 
(2.5)  (3.1)  (8.3)  (I 1.0)  (I 1.1)  (7.0) 
Body  size 
Micro-mini  .  .  .  -11.8  -8.1  -4.5  -0.3  ... 
(7.8)  (8.0)  (7.0)  (6.3) 
Large auto  . .  .  11.5  5.7  3.9  0.3  ... 
(5.0)  (5.7)  (5.0)  (4.5) 
Body  types  ...  ...  -0.2  1.9  0.9  ... 
(2.3)  (2.1)  (1.9) 
Price  ...  ...  0.57 x  10-3  0.80 x  10-3  0.60 x  10-3  0.6 x  10-3 
(0.3 x  10-3)  (0.28 x  10-3)  (0.25 x  10-3)  (0.2 x  10-3) 
Project scope  (NH)  ...  ..  ...  41.1  29.8  27.7 
(13.6)  (12.5)  (  1.0) 
Japan  -19.9  ...  ...  ...  -12.5  -13.0 
(3.8)  (4.4)  (3.8) 
Summnary  statistics 
R2  .501  .248  .301  .480  .603  .645 
Standard error  10.1  12.5  12.0  10.4  9.1  8.6 
Degrees  of freedom  27  26  24  23  22  25 
Source:  Authors' calculations.  See text description. 
a.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
twenty  months)  is displayed  in column  1.  There  was no direct  adjustment 
of lead time  data.  Unlike  engineering  hours,  where some portion  of total 
hours was not counted, lead time reflected  the total elapsed time from 
product  concept to market.  No adjustment  was necessary. This meant 
that in addition  to the measures  of product  complexity  explored  earlier 
(size, body types, and price), we also needed to include a measure of 
product  scope as an independent  variable.  We therefore  estimated  the 
fraction  of total parts  developed new and developed in-house. U repre- 
sented the unique  parts ratio (the fraction  of total parts unique to this 
project), and S the supplier  ratio (the fraction of parts engineered  by 
suppliers).  Then  NH  =  U (1 -  S), where  NH is scope and  varies  between 
O  and 1. 
The evidence on the effect of product complexity on lead time in 
table 4 was mixed. We found no effect for body types, suggesting  that 
the additional  activities associated with multiple  body types were han- 
dled in parallel.  There were significant  differences  among size classes, 
with differences  between micro-minis  and large vehicles amounting  to 
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diminished  sharply  when we introduced  the price variable  in column  3. 
The coefficient  on price  implied  that  a standard  deviation  increase  in the 
price ($9,500)  added  5.4 months  to lead time. 
The  evidence  in  column  4 shows that  scope (NH) had  a strong  positive 
effect on lead time. Thus for a given level of complexity,  bringing  more 
of the work  in-house  and  using  fewer common  parts  increased  lead time. 
The coefficient  on NH in column  4 implied  that  bringing  an additional  20 
percent of the engineering  effort in-house and inside the project (for 
example,  an increase  of NH from  0.4 to 0.6) would add eight months  to 
lead time. 
Taking  into account  the parts  engineering  structure  and  the project's 
complexity  reduced  the estimated  Japanese  advantage  in lead time  from 
19.9 to 12.5 months. Adding  the Japan  dummy  also reduced  the coeffi- 
cient on NH. The implication  was that  at least some part  of the Japanese 
lead time advantage  had to do with differences  in the role of suppliers 
and  the unique  parts  ratio. 
To sharpen understanding  of the relative importance of the two 
factors, we examined  them separately  in table 5. The results suggested 
that the reduction  in the Japanese  advantage  came from  controlling  the 
supplier  participation  ratio, while the unique  parts  ratio  had  little effect. 
However, the unique parts ratio accounted for the power of NH  to 
explain variation  in lead time within regions. Differences in supplier 
participation  appeared  to depend on differences  between the Japanese 
and the other producers;  the variable  explained little of the variation 
within  regions. 
These  results  underscored  the advantage  the Japanese  firms  appeared 
to derive from the capability of their supply base, which has been 
reported  by a number  of authors.31  The Japanese  firms  appeared  to draw 
on a set of suppliers whose capability created an advantage in both 
engineering  hours and lead time. Together  with differences  in product 
complexity, the very different supplier structure  in Japan seemed to 
account  for an important  part  of the Japanese  advantage.  We estimated 
that about 30 to 40 percent of the Japanese  advantage  in the raw data 
reflected  differences  in project  strategy. 
31. The  importance  of the  supplier  network  in  Japan  has  been  emphasized,  for  instance, 
by Ken-ichi  Imai,  Ikujiro  Nonaka,  and Hirotaka  Takeuchi,  "Managing  the New Product 
Development  Process: How Japanese Companies  Learn and Unlearn," in Clark  and 
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Table 5.  Separate Effects of Unique Parts and Supplier-Engineered Parts on Lead Timea 
Lead time 
Independent  variable  1  2  3 
Constant  39.5  49.6  35.1 
(7.0)  (10.8)  (7.9) 
Price  0.6  x  10-3  0.5  x  10-3  0.5  x  10-s 
(0.2  x  10-3)  (0.2  x  10-3)  (0.2  x  10-3) 
Project scope  (NH)  27.2  ...  ... 
(11.0) 
Inverse  supplier ratio (1 -  S)  .  .  .  6.1 
(12.8) 
Unique  parts  ...  ...  .  27.5 
(10.0) 
Japan  -13.0  -14.5  -19.8 
(3.8)  (5.3)  (3.7) 
Summary  statistics 
R  2  .645  .558  .659 
Standard error  8.57  9.6  8.40 
Degrees  of freedom  25  25  25 
Source:  Authors'  calculations.  See  text description. 
a.  Standard errors in parentheses.  This is one of the few cases  in which mathematical form (multiplicative/nonlinear 
versus  linear) makes a significant difference in results.  If U and (I -  S) are both entered additively,  the Japan dummy 
coefficient  is estimated  at  -  17.1 (standard error 4.7),  whereas  in the  multiplicative  U(l -S)  form reported in col- 
umn  1, the Japan dummy coefficient  is estimated  at  -13.0  (standard error 3.8). 
Project Organization  and Performance 
Even after  controlling  for project  strategy,  Japanese  firms  seemed to 
enjoy a significant  advantage  in both lead time and engineering  hours. 
The framework  described earlier suggested that project performance 
was influenced  not only by scope and complexity but also by the way 
the work in the project was organized and the way problems were 
diagnosed  and solved. In this section we examine the effects of differ- 
ences in organizational  structure  and the problem-solving  process on 
project  performance. 
The literature  on organization  theory and R&D suggests that devel- 
oping a complex product such as an automobile  confronts  a firm  with 
two organizational  requirements.  The first is the need to specialize 
engineering tasks so  that many activities can be done in parallel, 
shortening  the critical path.32  Moreover, specialization  permits focus 
32. See, for example, Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, Organization  and 
Environment: Managing  Differentiation  and Integration  (Homewood,  Ill.: Irwin, 1967); 
and Henry Mintzberg,  The Structuring of  Organizations:  A Synthesis  of  the Research 
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and the achievement  of expertise. The second requirement  is the need 
to integrate  specialized  activities  to create  a coherent  whole. This  means 
more  than  just fitting  pieces together:  integration  requires  that  the pieces 
themselves be designed  with system requirements  in mind. Specializa- 
tion and integration  affect the number  of people involved in a project 
and  the time required  for coordination  and  completion  of activities. 
Within a given structure  of specialization and integration,  project 
performance  will depend  on the way problems  are  diagnosed  and  solved. 
The information-processing  framework  described  earlier  suggests that 
how problem-solving  tasks are linked will have an important  influence 
on the effectiveness of that  process. Two aspects of that  linkage  appear 
critical. The first is the degree of overlap in timing  between upstream 
and  downstream  activities. The second is the pattern  of communication 
between them. Overlap  affects lead time directly but may also affect 
engineering  hours,  depending  on  the need  for  engineering  changes  caused 
by the downstream  group's early start. This in turn  will depend on the 
speed and  quality  of communication.  Thus  these two aspects of problem 
solving  are closely interrelated. 
ORGANIZATIONAL  STRUCTURE  AND  PERFORMANCE 
All the firms in our sample met the requirements  for specialization 
and integration,  but they met them in different ways. Much of the 
specialization  we observed was determined  by the technology. and in 
broad  terms  was uniform  across the industry.  All the firms,  for example, 
had functional departments that handled body engineering, chassis 
engineering,  vehicle  testing,  and  so forth.  Within  these broad  categories, 
however, the extent of specialization  varied significantly.  Where car 
doors might be the responsibility  of a door systems engineer in one 
company,  another  company  might  have divided that work into several 
activities, creating in the process the door lock engineer (an actual 
position  in at least one firm  studied).  We also found  different  approaches 
to integration. 
Our first task was to define variables that captured  the important 
differences  in  organizational  structure.  Much  of the  literature  has studied 
integration  in terms  of coordination  within  the project  group.33  We found 
it useful to add the need for integration  between the project  group  and 
33.  This focus  on internal coordination  is one key aspect  of the influential work by 
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supporting  activities  within  the parent  company  and  between  the project 
group  and  potential  customers.  This  need  for  external  integration  seemed 
particularly  important  in situations (as in the auto industry)  in which 
both the product  and its context were complex and changing.  The need 
is not only for the timely flow of good information  about what related 
specialized  activities  are doing  so that  coordination  may occur, but also 
for continual  updating  of the overall  product  concept  through  interaction 
with engineers and the market, and diffusion of the concept into the 
development  process throughout  the life of the project. 
With the need for both internal  and external linkages in mind, we 
defined  three  broad  approaches  to integration. 
-Functional  structure. Development is organized into functional 
departments  (for  example,  body engineering);  activities  are  coordinated 
through the functional hierarchy, rules, procedures, and traditions. 
There  is no project  manager  and  no matrix  structure. 
-Lightweight  project manager.  Work is organized into functional 
departments.  A project  manager  is in charge of coordinating  activities 
but has little influence over the content of the project. The project 
manager  has little influence  outside the project, works through  lower- 
level liaison people within the project, and has relatively low status 
within  the organization. 
-Heavyweight  project  manager.  The project manager  is not only a 
coordinator  but a concept champion  with direct responsibility  for all 
aspects of the project. He or she has strong influence outside the 
development  group,  works  directly  with  the engineers  (creates  a project 
team),  and  has high  status  within  the organization  (equivalent  to head  of 
a major  functional  department,  for example). 
To the extent that external integration  is important,  we expected a 
clear  ranking,  with  the heavyweight  structure  the most effective and  the 
functional  structure  the least.34 
Using the evidence developed through  the interviews  and question- 
34.  The expectation  is consistent  with evidence  in the literature on innovation  that 
more successful  projects are often associated  with the existence  of a "champion"  who 
provides  critical support, motivation,  and direction.  See James Brian Quinn, Strategies 
for  Change  (Homewood,  Ill.:  Irwin,  1980); Modesto  A.  Maidique,  "Entrepreneurs, 
Champions, and Technological  Innovation,"  Sloan Management  Review, vol. 21 (Winter 
1980), pp. 39-76; Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, In Search of Excellence: 
Lessons  firom America's  Best-Run  Companies  (Harper  & Row,  1982),  chap.  7;  and 
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naires, we classified each project, by region, into one of these three 
categories.  Historically,  the  functional  structure  was the dominant  mode 
of organizing  development, and five of the twelve projects in Europe 
(and  one of five in the United States) retained  that structure.  Beginning 
in the 1960s  and accelerating  (especially in Japan)  in the 1970s, many 
firms  throughout  the industry  introduced  project management.  In our 
sample,  69 percent  (nineteen  of twenty-nine)  of the projects  used a light- 
weight structure;  only four had heavyweight  project managers.  There 
was a hint in the international  patterns  that strong  project  management 
might  be associated  with  higher  performance.  All Japanese  projects  used 
project  managers;  the United States also used project  managers,  but all 
were lightweight;  European  producers  appeared  to make  more  frequent 
use of the functional  form  than  their  counterparts  elsewhere. 
Using dummy variables  for lightweight  and heavyweight projects, 
table  6 shows the relationship  between the organizational  variables  and 
project performance.  The engineering  hours equations in columns 1 
through  3 show that average adjusted  engineering  hours differ among 
the organizational  types. With  or without  controls  for project strategy, 
we found that heavyweight projects used far fewer hours than the 
functional  projects,  with  the lightweight  projects  in  the middle.  In  column 
2, with the control  variables  added, the heavyweight  effect is about  two 
standard  deviations  from the lightweight  effect, which is in turn about 
two standard  deviations  from  the functional  mean. 
Although  the organizational  categories  consisted of projects  from at 
least two regions, the Japanese  dominated  the heavyweight  group  and 
were not represented  in the functional  category. The implication  was 
that organizational  variables may explain some part of the Japanese 
effect. Adding the Japan dummy in column 4 reduces the estimated 
organization  effects, although  both remain  sizable. The Japan  dummy 
itself is much  lower than it was when the organizational  variables  were 
excluded  (-  2600).  There  was clearly  more  behind  the coefficient  on the 
Japan  dummy than differences in organizational  structure, but those 
differences  seemed  to play an important  role. 
Another  picture  emerged  when we looked at lead time. While there 
were clear differences in the mean values of lead time between the 
organizational  categories, adding  the Japan  dummy  reduced  the effect 
sharply.  With the control variables in the equation, the heavyweight 
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Table 6.  Effects of Organizational Structure on Engineering Hours and Lead Timea 
Engineering  holurs  Lead time 
Independent  variable  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Constant  6876  2995  3403  66.0  32.4  40.8 
(1039)  (1371)  (1344)  (5.9)  (11.4)  (11.2) 
Controlsb  inc.  exc.  exc.  inc.  exc.  exc. 
Heavyweight  manager  -  4558  -  4578  -  3387  -  20.0  -  17.5  -  10.5 
(1558)  (1183)  (1349)  (8.9)  (6.8)  (7.0) 
Lightweight manager  -  2436  -  2014  -  1484  -  13.0  -  8.5  5.1 
(1161)  (889)  (915)  (6.6)  (4.9)  (4.8) 
Japan  . ..  . .  .  -  1441  . .  .  . ..  -9.7 
(871)  (4.4) 
Slummary  statistics 
R2  .224  .564  .595  .149  .575  .638 
Standard error  2322  1746  1684  13.3  9.4  8.7 
Degrees  of freedom  26  23  22  26  23  22 
Source:  Authors' calculations.  See  text description. 
a.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
b.  Controls for engineering hours: price, body type,  micro-mini dummy. Controls for lead time: price, body type, 
project scope.  Inc.  means controls  were included; exc.  means they were excluded. 
in turn  was 8.5 months  faster than the functional  projects. While these 
differences were significant, the standard  errors on the coefficients 
precluded  strong  conclusions,  except for  the gap  between  functional  and 
heavyweight, where the two groups were far apart. With the Japan 
dummy  in the equation,  even this difference  was not significant.  Com- 
pared  with the estimating  equation  with organization  effects removed, 
the  Japan  dummy  in column  6 was about  3 months  less (12.5  versus  9.7). 
The evidence suggested that patterns of integration  had a much 
stronger  effect on engineering  hours than on lead time, although the 
direction  of the effects was similar.  In both cases the results with the 
Japan  dummy  implied  that organizational  structure  was closely related 
to other  sources  of difference  between  Japan  and  the Western  producers. 
This accorded  with information  developed in our interviews,  where we 
found that projects  with a heavyweight  project  manager,  for example, 
also had distinctive  patterns  of specialization,  information  processing, 
and problem  solving. Although  these patterns  were not unique to the 
heavyweight organization, the evidence suggested that the overall 
paradigm,  the ensemble of internal structure  and process, made the 
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SPECIALIZATION  AND  PERFORMANCE 
The degree of specialization  in a development organization  affects 
the level of expertise  in any given task, the complexity  of coordination, 
and the possibility of idle time and duplication of effort. For these 
reasons, specialization  will probably  influence  both engineering  hours 
and  lead time. In theory, the relationship  is likely to be U-shaped. If the 
degree of specialization  is very small, more specialization  will expand 
expertise,  permit  parallel  processing  of critical  path  activities,  and  reduce 
hours and lead time. This effect usually diminishes as the degree of 
specialization  increases, since division of the work into clear-cut sub- 
tasks becomes more difficult.  At this point more specialization  means 
more  idle time and task duplication,  leading  to increases  in engineering 
hours.  In addition,  time and  resources  for coordination  grow  as special- 
ization increases and beyond some point may add to the overall hours 
and  increase  lead time. 
The number  of participants  in a project provides at least a rough 
indicator  of the  degree  of specialization.  We  collected  data  on the number 
of participants  for a subset of the total sample, and also explored the 
issue of specialization  in our field work. Although  these data were not 
sufficient  for  extended  statistical  analysis,  they  provided  some  indication 
of the pattern of specialization  in our sample and its relationship  to 
performance. 
Table  7 presents  the mean  number  of project  engineers  by region  and 
type of organizational  structure.  These data suggest that the degree of 
specialization  is lower in Japanese  projects, a difference  borne out in 
our interviews. The heavyweight organizations  have fewer people, 
Table 7.  Project Specialization: Average Number of Engineers, by Region and 
Type of Organization 
Number  of  Number  of 
Region  Engineersa  observations  Organization  Engineersa  observations 
Japan  485  11  Heavyweight  333  3 
United States  903  3  Lightweight  573  15 
Europe  904  8  Functional  1,421  4 
Source: Authors'  survey. 
a.  Total number  of engineers  and technical support  personnel  who were involved with the project  on more than a short-term 
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Table 8.  Specialization and Performance Correlations 
Corri  elation with 
niumber  of 
Item  engineersa 
Unadjusted engineering hours  .65 (.17) 
Lead time  .60 (.18) 
Adjusted engineering hours residualb  .57 (.18) 
Lead-time residualc  .61 (.18) 
Source:  Authors' calculations.  See  text description. 
a.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
b.  Controlling for car size,  number of body types,  and price. 
c.  Controlling for car size,  number of body types,  price, and scope. 
especially when compared  with the functional  groups. Once again, our 
field  work  was consistent  with  this  observation:  we found  that  the heavy- 
weight project managers often led relatively small, multifunctional 
teams. Functional  organizations  drew people from many disciplines, 
subdivided  tasks significantly,  and  thus tended  to be large. 
Our  data  also indicated  that  greater  specialization  was associated  with 
less effective performance.  Table 8 presents correlations  between the 
number  of participants  and  measures  of engineering  hours  and  lead time 
using  a subset  of the sample.  Whether  we controlled  for project  strategy 
or not, projects  with  more  people  took longer  to complete  and  consumed 
more  total  engineering  hours,  even after  at least some control  for project 
complexity  and scope. 
Our  use of the number  of participants  to measure  specialization  raises 
the possibility  that  we picked  up a size effect.35  Although  a project  is not 
a permanent  organization,  and its size depends  on expected duration  as 
well as specialization,  there is at least a hint in the data that the more 
effective projects are likely to be smaller than average, with broader 
assignments  for participating  engineers. 
PROJECT  STAGE  OVERLAP,  INFORMATION  PROCESSING, 
AND  PERFORMANCE 
Because solving problems  is the central  activity in product  develop- 
ment, the way problem-solving  tasks are linked should  be important  to 
35. The size effect is consistent  with  the idea that  an increase  in the number  of people 
involved multiplies  exponentially  the communication  linkages, and thus coordination 
costs, in a program.  See Frederick  P. Brooks,  Jr., The  Mythical  Man-Month:  Essays on 
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project performance. The linkage between a given pair of tasks is 
determined  by the timing  of the activities  and the nature  of information 
transfer  and  communication  between  them. 
Suppose, for example,  that  a project  group  is faced with an upstream 
problem-solving  cycle (product  engineering)  and a downstream  cycle 
(process engineering).  The two activities may be strictly sequential,  or 
the downstream activity may begin before the upstream activity is 
complete. The longer  the period  in which both activities are operating, 
the greater  the degree  of overlap. 
Edwin Mansfield  and others presented the first statistical  evidence 
concerning  overlapping  activities  and  project  performance  in their  study 
of twenty-nine  innovations  in the chemical, machinery,  and electronics 
industries.36  They found a statistically  significant,  positive relationship 
between the extent of overlap and the speed with which a project  was 
carried  out. The implication  was that starting  sooner meant finishing 
sooner, unless overlap increased unit task time by the length of the 
overlap  or more. However, the managers  that  they interviewed  felt that 
increasing  overlap would lead to an increase in engineering  hours and 
thus cost because downstream  activities  would begin  before the results 
of the earlier  stages were known. Mistakes  and pursuit  of poor alterna- 
tives would lead to additional  work hours to correct the problem.  The 
expected  positive relationship  between overlap  and  cost appeared  to be 
consistent  with the data  in the Mansfield  study. 
Our  research  underscored  the importance  of overlap but suggested 
that its effect on lead time and cost depended on communication  and 
information  transfer  among  activities. 
We distinguished  between two general  approaches:  the batch model 
and  the dialogue  model. In batch  communication  all data  are  transmitted 
in one shot at the end of the activity. It is thus likely that an early start 
on downstream  activities  will  be based  on faulty  assumptions  concerning 
the upstream  activity's output  and that work will have to be redone. In 
the  dialogue  model  the  upstream  group  transmits  preliminary  information 
little by little, and the downstream  unit sends its own information  back 
upstream  in  a continual  give and  take. The  probability  of having  to repeat 
work is reduced, and the probability  that the upstream  activity will 
produce  output  that  can be efficiently  handled  by the downstream  group 
36.  Mansfield and others, Research  anid Innotyation,  chap. 7. 758  Brookings Paipers on Econiomic Activity,  3:1987 
is increased.  Overlap  is thus  less likely  to lead  to increased  costs. Indeed, 
communication  from  downstream  may even help reduce  them.37 
We  would  like  to have  had  a measure  of overlap  and  of communication 
patterns  to introduce  into ouI statistical  analysis, but obtaining  it posed 
formidable  problems.  For  a development  project  that  involves  thousands 
of unit activities and hundreds  of people, coming up with an average 
measure  is very  costly in time  and  resources.  Furthermore,  the definition 
of unit activities differs among  projects. To approach  the problem,  we 
first  developed  a rough  measure  of overlap  by aggregating  unit  activities 
up to a broad level where comparability  was possible and data were 
readily  available.38  We then identified  a small set of unit activities we 
expected to be representative  and studied  them through  interviews  and 
documentary  evidence. The design and development  of dies for outer 
body panels, for example, was on the critical path, and patterns of 
overlap  and communication  between body engineers  and die engineers 
were likely to show the way problem-solving  cycles were linked in the 
project  more  generally. 
Table  9 summarizes  the evidence  we developed,  comparing  the  degree 
of overlapping,  the intensity of information  processing, and degree of 
mismatch  between the two in each of our three  regions. 
In exploring  overlap, we looked at two kinds of evidence. The first 
was the overlapping  ratio,  defined  as the duration  of the engineering  task 
divided by total engineering  lead time. While this ratio was a gross 
aggregation  of the project  schedule, it provided  a rough  indicator  of true 
stage overlapping. We also looked at clinical data on the timing of 
resource commitment  activities, specifically product engineering  (up- 
stream)  and body die engineering  (downstream).  We looked at detailed 
timing charts and specified some key sequences of the activities (die 
design versus prototype, die cutting  and prototype).  We also looked at 
how complete  the upstream  activity  (for  example, testing)  was when the 
downstream  activity started. 
The results (table  9) indicated  that the Japanese  projects  were highly 
overlapped  in activities, the U.S. projects less so. European  projects 
37. For  example,  rounded  corners  are  easier  to mold  with  precision  than  square  corners 
but  harder  to machine.  Reminding  product  engineers  of this  may  ultimately  reduce  process 
engineering  time. 
38. This  approach  was consistent  with  the  analysis  performed  by Mansfield  and  others, 
Research and Innovation. Kim B.  Clark, W. Br-uce Chew, and Takahiro Fuejimoto  759 
Table 9.  Patterns of Overlapping and Information Processing, by Region 
Indicators  Japatn  Unzited  States  Eluopea 
Ove-rlappinig 
Engineering  overlap-  High  (1.63)  Medium  (1.53)  Low (1.37) 
ping  ratio 
Overlapping  between  Die design  starts  be-  Die design starts  after  Die desigrn  starts  after 
die design  and  fore 1st prototype  1st prototype  com-  1st prototype  com- 
prototype  complete  plete  plete 
Overlapping  between  Die cutting  starts  be-  Die cutting  starts  after  Die cutting  starts  after 
die cutting  and  fore last prototype  last prototype  com-  last prototype  com- 
prototype  complete  plete  plete 
Completeness  of  Sufficiently  representa- Often  not representa-  Regarded  as perfect 
prototypes  when  tive but not perfect  tive enough  when tested 
testing  starts 
Iniformnaition  processinig 
Formal  designs  released Three  Two  Two to three 
to body engineering 
Intra-R&D  communica- Formal  and informal;  Mostly  formal  through  Mostly  informal;  in- 
tion  intense  through  ne-  frequent  large  meet-  tense through  engi- 
cessity to coordinate  ings  neering  tradition 
Production-R&D  com-  Formal  and informal;  Mostly  formal  through  Mostly  formal  infre- 
munication  intense  through  ne-  frequent  large  meet-  quent  meetings 
cessity to coordinate  ings 
Iniformnation  mnismatch 
Ratio  of engineering  10-20  30-50  10-30 
change  costs in body 
dies (percent) 
Surprises  by down-  Moderate  Frequent  Infrequent 
stream  engineers 
Delay of introduction  1/6  delayed  1/2  delayed  1/3  delayed 
date 
Impact  of overlapping  Significant  (correlation Not significant  (correlation  coefficient  0.12, 
on lead time  coefficient -0.64)  U.S. and European  samples  combined) 
Simnmary 
Overlapping  High  Middle  Low 
Information  intensity  High  Low  Middle  to low 
a.  Profile is for companies  based  in Europe;  subsidiaries  of  U.S.  automakers  are roughly  similar to  the  parent 
companies. 
tended  to be the least overlapped,  that is, by far the most sequential  of 
the three. 
A number  of indicators  were used to assess each project's intensity 
of information  processing. One was whether product development 
released  semifinal  design information  to the die group  in addition  to the 
final  release, which would indicate  a dialogue.  In examining  the release 
of engineering  drawings  to die development groups, for example, we 
found that the Japanese released preliminary  information  more fre- 760  Br-ookings Papers  oni Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
quently;  three  releases  was common  practice.  The  U.S. projects  typically 
had two formal releases, while the Europeans  were usually between 
these figures. 
Interviews and observation  provided additional  information  on the 
density of information  exchange. We assumed that preliminary  infor- 
mation  tended  to be processed better  through  informal,  direct  contacts 
at working  levels. We  found  that  the  Japanese  communicated  informally 
and  intensively  both  intrafunctionally  and  interfunctionally  (that  is, more 
in a dialogue  mode), while the U.S. patterns  were much more formal. 
The Europeans  were again  in the middle,  with close, informal  commu- 
nication inside product  engineering  and formal  communication  across 
the functions. 
To support  this observation,  we also looked  for clinical  evidence that 
might  indicate  a process mismatch,  that  is, a combination  of overlapping 
stages and batch information  transfer. The assumption was that a 
significant  amount  of confusion in the development  process (high cost 
of engineering  changes,  frequent  surprises,  delay  of market  introduction 
schedules, and  so forth)  could imply  that  the project  had adopted  highly 
overlapping  and  low-intensity  (batch)  information  processing  at  the same 
time. 
Our clinical data indicated  significant  mismatches  in U.S. projects. 
Although they had a relatively high degree of overlap, information 
transfer  was not intense enough  to support  it efficiently.  The European 
projects  had  less overlap  but  moderately  intense information  processing 
(greater  information  exchange). Thus while there were fewer surprises 
and  delays, they did not take advantage  of their  information  structure  to 
reduce  lead time. 
Finally,  for relations  between  the overlapping  ratio  and  lead time, we 
found a strong  negative  correlation  in the Japanese  data  but little effect 
in the rest of the sample. The Japanese projects were getting greater 
benefits from overlapping  problem-solving  stages than the U.S.  and 
European  projects.  This may be another,  although  rough,  indication  of 
fewer mismatches  or more  downstream-oriented  designs, or both, in the 
Japanese  projects. 
To summarize  the data  in table 9, the Japanese  projects  show a high 
degree  of overlap  and  intensive  information  transfer.  U.S. projects  show 
moderate overlap and low-intensity batch information  processing-a 
fair amount  of mismatch.  European  projects  show the lowest degree of 
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transmission.  Thus some portion  of the Japanese  advantage  in both lead 
time  and  engineering  hours  may  be explained  by the regional  differences, 
among  the most  striking  we encountered  in  our  field  work.  Other  research 
into technology development differences elicited a similar pattern.39 
These conclusions  are tentative, but they appear  worth  further  investi- 
gation. We believe the two-dimensional  overlap-information  transfer 
model is more  useful than the simpler  one-dimensional  model. Still, as 
Mansfield  and others observed when introducing  overlap  as an explan- 
atory variable, "This is an interesting result, but only a beginning" 
(p. 152). 
RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  LEAD  TIME  AND  ENGINEERING  HOURS 
The statistical and clinical evidence suggests that the pattern of 
integration,  the degree of specialization, and the nature of problem 
solving accounts for a  significant portion of differences in project 
performance.  These results  are based on separate  analyses of lead time 
and engineering  hours. Theory suggests that, at least ex ante, there is a 
trade-off  between lead time and engineering  hours;  thus their relation- 
ship deserves examination. The existence of a trade-off does  not, 
however, explain the Japanese  advantage.  From the data on lead time 
alone,  one might  expect that  the  Japanese  had  achieved  faster  production 
by adding  more engineering  hours than their U.S. and European  com- 
petitors.  But that is not the case; the data show a significant  advantage 
in each dimension,  so that  while trading  engineering  hours  for lead time 
does not explain what the Japanese have done, the nature of the 
relationship  between hours and lead time may nonetheless shed some 
light  on the validity  of the conclusions  we have drawn  about  the role of 
the project  organization. 
Figure  1 shows the distribution  of engineering  hours  and lead time in 
unadjusted  form. As one might expect in unadjusted  data, there is a 
strong  positive relationship  between the two measures;  the correlation 
coefficient  is 0.693, with a standard  error  of 0. 139.40 Yet this positive 
39. See, for example, Imai and others, "Managing  the New Product  Development 
Process." 
40. As project  complexity  and scope increase, the cost-time trade-off  curve moves 
further  from  the origin.  Figure  2 shows the results  of projects  across a family  of curves 
rather  than  projects  on a single  curve. Much  of the work  described  earlier  in the section 
"Strategy  and Performance"  can be thought  of as collapsing  this family  of curves into a 
single  base  curve  to achieve  project  comparability. 762  Br-ookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
Figure  1. Unadjusted  Engineering  Hours  and  Unadjusted  Lead  Timea 
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relationship  appears even after controlling for project strategy and 
patterns  of integration.  Figure  2 plots residuals  from the fully specified 
regressions  reported  in table 6; the Japanese  projects  are identified  with 
the numeral 1. In computing  the residuals, we set the Japan dummy 
equal  to zero for all observations  so that  we might  see the residuals  with 
the Japan  effect present. 
There are two interesting  patterns  in these data. First, although  the 
Japanese  projects  had  a significant  advantage,  a few projects  from  both Kim B.  Clark, W. Bruce Chew, and Takahiro Fujimoto  763 
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the United States and Europe shared some characteristics  with the 
Japanese.  They were less specialized than the average  U.S. and Euro- 
pean project,  used smaller  development  teams, and made more use of 
the dialogue  mode of information  transfer.  This pattern  suggested that 
what  we saw  in  Japan  was not  uniquely  Japanese  but  a different  paradigm, 
elements  of which  could find  successful application  in other  countries. 
The second interesting pattern in figure 2 is  the strong positive 
relationship  between engineering  hours and lead time in the Japanese 
data;  the correlation  coefficient  is 0.753 with a standard  error  of 0.208. 
The U.S. and European  data show a random  pattern  of residuals, that 764  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
is, a correlation  coefficient  of 0.  100  with  a standard  error  of 0.257. While 
issues of estimation may explain some of the result,4"  our field work 
suggested  the pattern  in the Japanese  data  was what we would  expect to 
occur in the kind  of organization  characteristic  of most of the Japanese 
projects  in  our  sample:  multifunctional,  with  a dedicated  team,  significant 
overlap in timing,  a high degree of integration  in problem  solving, and 
little slack  in the organization.  In such an organization,  a random  shock 
that causes a delay or a change  in one part  of the project  will propagate. 
Because the team is dedicated  and there is little slack, people in other 
activities will continue to work; and because activities are integrated, 
other parts of the project will need to keep abreast of changes in the 
affected  activity  to maintain  a coordinated  effort.  As a result,  engineering 
hours  turn  out to be higher  than  expected. Even those Japanese  projects 
that  did not follow this pattern  exhibited  so little slack that shocks may 
have been able  to propagate. 
Random  shocks  are  likely  to have very different  effects in a functional 
organization  that has little overlap, limited  integration,  and some slack 
because  these characteristics  buffer  activities  from  one another.  Shocks 
do not propagate.  People not directly  affected  by the shock simply  work 
on other  projects.  Since activities  are  not tightly  integrated,  there  is little 
need for additional  coordination  time. Slack resources help absorb  the 
shock, but  overall  engineering  hours  may not change  at all. 
The data  in figure  2 are  thus consistent  with the idea  that  the Japanese 
effect  remaining  after  project  strategies  are  controlled  reflects  differences 
in project organization.  Taken together, the evidence on integration, 
specialization,  and problem  solving shows that much  of what we see in 
the data reflects  fundamental  differences  in the way projects are orga- 
nized  and  managed. 
41. The  positive  relationship  between  cost and  lead  time  was consistent  with  a number 
of  estimation  problems.  Missing  variables  (for  example,  specialization  and  problem  solving) 
that  are  associated  with  both  improved  costs and  lead times  would  generate  the observed 
relationship  if they  were  present  in increasing  amounts  across  the projects  as observations 
move from  the origin.  Alternatively,  the pattern  in the Japanese  data  is consistent  with a 
multiplicative  Japan  dummy  (as opposed  to the additive  dummy  actually  used) if project 
size increases  as the observations  move from the origin. Finally, this pattern  would be 
expected if our control  variables  were effective only among  the non-Japanese  projects. 
An  observation-by-observation  analysis  suggested  that  none  of these  issues  was  significant. 
We must look elsewhere  to explain  the positive relationship  between engineering-hour 
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Alternative Explanations 
There are, of course, competing hypotheses that may explain our 
data. Three that deserve specific comment involve use of additional 
capital equipment, differences in quality and manufacturability,  and 
scale. Producing  comparable  output faster and with less labor might 
plausibly  be explained  by greater  use of automation,  perhaps  especially 
computer-aided  design (CAD) and computer-aided  engineering  (CAE). 
More  intensive  Japanese  use of computer  systems might  explain  part  of 
the regional  performance  differences. But our interviews with project 
engineers  as well as secondary sources suggested that CAD/CAE sys- 
tems were heavily used by engineers  at all the companies  studied, with 
no evidence to indicate  that  the Japanese  used them more  intensively. 
Differences  in quality  and manufacturability  could explain the Japa- 
nese advantage  if Japanese products in comparable  size classes per- 
formed worse, were aesthetically inferior, or were more difficult to 
manufacture.  But none of these is true. The evidence in the trade  press, 
in independent  product evaluations, and in the marketplace  is clear: 
Japanese  products  are, if anything,  of higher  quality  than  those produced 
in  the United  States  and  are  at  least competitive  with  European  products. 
The evidence on manufacturability  is even stronger.  Data on product 
reliability,  defect rates, and manufacturing  productivity  point to Japa- 
nese leadership.42  Our  own evidence on manufacturability  suggests  that 
the Japanese  projects in our sample had many fewer design bugs and 
went through  manufacturing  start-up  with many fewer problems  .4  It 
would appear  that we should add an advantage  in manufacturability  to 
the advantages  in hours  and  lead time. 
Finally,  differences  in scale  could  account  for  differences  in  efficiency. 
The scale effects considered  here were those associated with firm  size 
42. See Abernathy,  Clark,  and  Kantrow,  Indlistrial  Renaissance. 
43. As part  of our  ongoing  research  we have  investigated  production  start-up  at twelve 
of the firms  in our study (six Japanese,  three U.S., and three European).  The Japanese 
took  an  average  of 1  month  to go from  production  start  to sales start;  the U.S. average  was 
4 months,  the European  2 months.  The Japanese  projects  averaged  4 months  to return  to 
normal  productivity  levels and 1.4  months  to return  to normal  quality  levels, U.S. projects 
averaged  5 months  for productivity  and 11  months  for quality,  and European  projects  12 
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(economies of scale) or firm-wide  development  activity (economies of 
scope). Our  projects  showed virtually  no relationship,  positive or nega- 
tive, with  either  measure  of scale, suggesting  that  the size of the project, 
considered  earlier,  is the relevant  measure  of scale for these activities. 
Summary and Conclusions 
We began this paper with two objectives: to document  the interna- 
tional differences in product development performance  in the auto 
industry  and to identify  their sources. One of the most striking  aspects 
of the data we developed is the large Japanese  advantage  in lead time 
and engineering  hours. A part of that advantage  reflects differences  in 
the kinds of vehicles developed and the role of suppliers. Much of it, 
however, is real. The best of the Japanese  firms  seem able to develop a 
vehicle of competitive quality  in much less time and with many fewer 
engineering  resources  than  their  U.S. or European  competitors. 
That advantage  appears  to depend on the strength  of the Japanese 
supply  base and  the way projects  are  organized  and  managed.  While  our 
data  did  not  lend  themselves  to a detailed  discussion  of supplier  relations, 
Japanese  suppliers  play  a significantly  different  role  in  the design  process 
than most of their U.S. and European  counterparts.  This role may be a 
major  source of the Japanese  advantage  in lead time. The organization 
of the project  is also important.  In the best of the Japanese  projects, a 
heavyweight project manager  leads a multifunctional  team, in which 
problem-solving  cycles are  overlapped  and  closely linked  through  inten- 
sive dialogue. While there are exceptions, the patterns in the United 
States and Europe  are in general  quite different,  and these differences 
appear  to be important  in explaining  the Japanese  advantage. 
How did the differences originate?  Why do Japanese firms use a 
different  engineering  paradigm?  Why  are European  producers  so strongly 
linked to a functional  organization  structure?  A full treatment  of such 
questions  is beyond  the scope of this  paper,  but  we can suggest  a possible 
explanation. 
Until the early 1970s,  the European,  Japanese,  and U.S. automobile 
markets  were not closely linked.  The customers,  types of products,  and 
competitive structures  were different. While there was some trade in 
certain  market  segments, companies'  decisions and actions were domi- Kim B.  Clark, W. Bruce Chew, and Takahiro Fiijimoto  767 
nated by domestic market issues.  The engineering paradigms that 
developed thus reflected the particular  circumstances in which the 
domestic  firms  competed. 
In  Japan,  rapid  growth  of production  and  intense  domestic  competition 
conditioned  the development  of engineering  capability.  Chronic  short- 
ages of engineers  placed sharp  limits on specialization  and a premium 
on supplier  capability.  Competition  motivated  a search  for faster  devel- 
opment  cycles and  more  efficient  use of engineers.44  U.S. and  European 
competitors  also created approaches  to engineering  and development 
that reflected  the constraints  and opportunities  they faced. And those 
approaches  were successful  in those environments.  But  as markets  have 
become more closely linked, the differences  in engineering  paradigms 
have begun to have significance  for international  competition. Both 
project  strategy  and  organization  have begun  to change  among  U.S. and 
European  competitors. Adjustment  costs are high, however, and ad- 
justment periods long. Thus fifteen years after the first oil shock, we 
have observed sharp differences in strategy and organization, and 
consequent differences in performance.45  Our expectation is that the 
paradigms  will  continue  to evolve in  all  three  regions,  and  that  differences 
are  likely  to narrow. 
Our  results have implications  for practice and for further  research. 
The evidence on strategy  and  organization  illuminates  the determinants 
of project  performance  that the firms  in our study have already  found 
useful. To the extent that the study results are representative  of devel- 
opments in the manufacture  of complex products, managers  in other 
industries  may find the results on heavyweight  project managers,  the 
role  of suppliers,  and  the problem-solving  process of interest. 
Several issues deserve further research. We plan to examine in 
particular  the role  of suppliers  in development,  the engineering  problem- 
solving  process, and  the relationship  between lead time and  engineering 
44.  See Michael A. Cusumano,  Thze  Japanese  Alutomobile Industry: Technology and 
Management at Nissan  and Toyota (Harvard University Press,  1985). 
45. Because  the Japanese  were already  producing  smaller,  fuel-efficient  front-wheel 
drive vehicles before the oil crisis, the more fuel-efficient  designs that have become 
common  since 1973  may  have  represented  a smaller  technological  step  for  them.  But  while 
this  explanation  may  seem  plausible  when  comparing  Japan  with  the United  States  (though 
even  here,  the  projects  studied  were  not  the first  front-wheel  drive,  post-oil-shock  vehicles 
the  firms  developed),  it clearly  cannot  be applied  to explain  the major  differences  between 
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hours. In addition,  we need to examine empirically  the role of product 
development in competition, particularly  in a dynamic environment. 
The issues we have examined  also need to be studied  in other  industries. 
It is especially important  to study the development  process and its role 
in competition  in situations  in which basic technologies are changing 
more rapidly  than  is true  with automobiles.  This kind  of work will shed 
light  on the power  of the concepts  we have developed, the robustness  of 
the engineering  paradigms  we have uncovered, and the general  role of 
product  development  in international  competition. 
Appendix: Adjustment  of Engineering  Hours 
A vehicle design  project's  engineering  hours  fall into four classes: 
-EL:  parts-specific  engineering hours internal to the project. EI 
represents  the development  hours spent by the project team on engi- 
neering  specific  parts  and  components. 
-EC:  engineering-hour  equivalent  for nonunique  parts.  This class of 
engineering  time is of the same type as EI, but the work  is performed  by 
an earlier  project  team (in the case of carryover  parts)  or a project  team 
working  on another  vehicle currently  in production  (common  parts). 
-ES:  parts-specific  engineering  hours performed  by outside sup- 
pliers. Parts  suppliers  may participate  in the engineering  of new parts. 
This work  is conceptually  similar  to EI and  EC but is, again,  performed 
by a group  different  from  the project  team. 
-ET:  total parts-specific  engineering  hours. By definition, ET  = 
EI + ES  + EC. 
-N:  non-parts-specific  engineering  hours. Designing  a new vehicle 
requires more than  just the design of a large number  of parts. Such 
activities as concept generation,  product  planning,  packaging,  styling, 
prototype vehicle assembly, and vehicle testing are all examples of 
critical  engineering  tasks that are not component-specific.  Engineering 
hours  that  are vehicle- but not parts-specific  are represented  by N. 
The engineering  hours data we wanted to analyze were the total 
vehicle engineering  hours, MHadj =  N  +  ET. Unfortunately,  firms 
measured only the project team's  hours, which is MHobs  =  N  +  EI. 
The scope of the projects varied significantly,  so we had to develop 
project-specific  adjustment  factors. What  we needed was some adjust- Kim B. Clark, W. Bruce Chew, anid  Takahiro  Fljirnoto  769 
ment factor,  A,  such that MHadj  =  MHobs  x  1/A or A  =  MHobs/ 
MHadj  =  (N  + EJ)/(N  + ET). 
A can be interpreted  as the in-project  engineering  ratio  as it refers to 
the fraction  of total vehicle engineering  work  done by the project  team. 
COMPUTING  THE  ADJUSTMENT  FACTOR 
Let b represent  the fraction of total vehicle work that is part- and 
component-specific:  b =  ET/(N  + ET). 
We define the fraction  of nonunique  (common)  parts engineering  to 
total parts  engineering,  C, and  the fraction  of unique  parts  development 
performed by suppliers, S, as C =  EC/ET and S  =  ES/(ES  + El).  Now 
by substitution, 
A  = (N  + EI)/(N  + ET) =  b (N  + EI + ES  -  ES)/ET 
=  b {N  +  ET [(1  -  C)  -  ES]}/ET  b [N  +  ET  -C  (ET  -  ES)]/ET 
=  b [ lb  -  C (ET  +  ES)/ET]  =  -  b [C  +  ES/ET] 
=  -b b{C  +  [ES/(ES  +  El)]  (1-  C)}  =  1-b  [(C  +  S)  (1  -  C)]. 
This  form  has a very direct  interpretation.  It says that  A, the in-project 
design  ratio, is equal  to one minus  the fraction  of the total project  that  is 
nonunique  parts-specific  engineering,  bC, and the supplier-performed, 
unique parts-specific engineering, b[S(l  -  C)]. 
What  are needed now are estimates  of S, C, and b. If S is the ratio  of 
supplier  participation  in new parts development, then S  -  ES/(ES + 
EI) = SP + (BB *  BBO),  where  SP is the supplier  proprietary  parts  ratio, 
BB is the black  box parts  ratio,  DC is the detail-controlled  parts  ratio  (so 
that SP  + BB + DC  =  1), and BBO is the black box outside engineering 
ratio. 
These ratios were determined  as follows. In our questionnaire  we 
asked  project  engineers  about  the fraction  of each of the following  parts 
categories  as a fraction  of the total value of purchased  parts: 
-Supplier proprietary  parts:  those parts  developed entirely  by parts 
vendors  as their  standard  products.  Almost all the engineering  work  for 
developing  such  parts  is naturally  done  by the suppliers.  Batteries,  spark 
plugs,  and  tires are examples  of this category. 
-Black  box parts: those parts whose basic engineering  (exterior, 
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the automakers,  while  detailed  engineering  (engineering  drawings,  parts 
prototype  building,  parts testing), is done by the suppliers.  Radiators, 
air  conditioners,  and  other  functional  parts  may be classified  here. 
-Detail-controlled  parts: those parts developed entirely by  the 
automakers.  Many  of the body-related  parts  belong  to this category. 
The questionnaire  asked the engineers  to estimate the share  of each 
category (SP,  BB,  and DC) by value. They answered in terms of the 
fraction  of total procurement  costs, so that the three numbers  add to 1. 
Assuming that average engineering  contents are similar  for all parts 
categories,  these indicators  reasonably  represent  the share  of engineer- 
ing work  load in each category. 
We also collected data on the split of engineering  hours between 
automakers  and  parts  suppliers  for each  parts  category.  After  discussion 
with engineers at several manufacturers,  we estimated the suppliers' 
fractions  as follows: supplier  proprietary  parts showed all engineering 
performed  by the supplier,  black box parts  were 70 percent  engineered 
by the supplier,  and  detail-controlled  parts  had  no engineering  provided 
by the supplier.  Using these data, we estimated 
S  =  ES/(ES  +  El)  =  SP  +  BB  BBO  =  SP  +  BB  *  0.7. 
The nonunique  parts ratio, C, was constructed as C  Cl  +  C2, 
where Cl is the fraction  of parts  common  with other  existing  vehicles in 
the firm, in terms of number  of parts, and C2 is the fraction of parts 
carried  over from  the predecessor  model. 
The respondents  answered  by classifying  detail  parts  drawings  (typi- 
cally  2,000  to 3,000)  as new or nonunique.  Assuming  that  the engineering 
content  for each part  is distributed  similarly  in both categories,  the ratio 
can be regarded  as a reasonable  indicator  of engineering  work  load. 
After these steps, the unique  parts  ratio was calculated  as 1 -  C = 
1 -  Cl  -  C2,  and the nonunique parts ratio as C =  Cl  +  C2. 
We assumed  that  b, the fraction  of parts-specific  hours  in total hours, 
was a constant  within  each region. (We also tested the effect of holding 
b constant across all three regions. It had little if any effect on our 
results.) The figures  we used were Japan,  0.9; United States, 0.7; and 
Europe,  0.8. These figures  are based on interviews  with several  firms  in 
each region. The interviews did not request estimates of b directly 
because, as noted earlier, the firms did not monitor nonproject  team 
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that is, to estimate  the part  of the project  team's engineering  work that 
was parts specific. The ratio b could then be calculated based on the 
known  data: 
a  =  EI/(N  +  EI) 
N =  (1 -  a) *  MHobs 
EI  =  a *  MHobs 
ET  =  EI  +  ES  +  EC  =  EI (1  +  ES/EI)/(l  -  C). 
THE  ADJUSTMENT 
From the above assumptions  and figures  it was possible to estimate 
an  adjustment  factor,  A, for each  project  by using  project-specific  figures 
for all variables with the exception of the regional estimates of b. 
Adjustment  factors were computed  and, when applied  to the reported 
engineering  hours data, produced  the adjusted  engineering  hours data 
reported  in table  2. Comments 
and Discussion 
John Meyer: This paper  is particularly  rich in the quantity  and quality 
of its data. The authors'  hypotheses are plausible.  However, their  case 
is not quite proved. Three basic problems need further  investigation. 
First, there is the matter  of how the data are defined  and interpreted. 
Second, problems of model specification arise. Finally, and closely 
related to model specification,  there is the possibility that alternative 
hypotheses might  explain  at least some of the observed effects as well 
or better  than  the hypothesis  advanced.  Many  of my comments  will thus 
be concerned  with questions  of research  strategy  or approach. 
Let me start  with a few examples of problems  in sample  design and 
data interpretation.  The price data on automobile models are very 
important  to the authors' explanations. They specify that 1987 U.S. 
retail automobile  prices are used "wherever possible." When these 
prices were unavailable,  they derived estimates by applying relative 
price or markup  ratios from global models and comparisons. This 
methodology  makes  interpretation  of the resulting  price  data somewhat 
uncertain.  Are the relationships  between markups  really that constant 
despite the somewhat  special characteristics  of the U.S. market  (such 
as different  requirements  for antipollution  equipment)?  Casual obser- 
vation strongly  suggests that the manufacturers  of Mercedes and some 
other makes charge higher markups  in the U.S.  market. A research 
strategy  that  would provide  better  controls, although  costly in terms  of 
degrees of freedom, would be to restrict  the sample  to models actually 
traded  in U.S. markets  so that  all prices would be directly  comparable. 
Another  data problem  arises with the body size variable.  In the end 
(although  they seem to have collected more data than this usage would 
indicate) the authors essentially adopt a simple dichotomy between 
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micro-minis,  as based on three Japanese cars or cases, and all other 
body sizes. But other continuous-size measures-direct  weight mea- 
sures, litterage,  engine  displacement-are available  and  usually  provide 
more information. 
An obvious  question  emerges.  What  would  happen  to the regressions 
if the three micro-mini  models were removed from the sample? The 
micro-minis  are not only a very special subsample, but they are sold 
only in Japan,  so their  prices  do not allow direct  comparisons  with those 
in the U.S. market.  Results with and without  this subsample  should  be 
contrasted. 
Similarly, what is the relevant unit of observation, or at least of 
aggregation?  The authors  rely heavily on the nation-state  as a basis for 
aggregation.  But auto manufacturing  is an international  industry  with 
some companies  involved in several  different  countries.  (I am not sure, 
for example,  just why General  Motors Europe comes under the U.S. 
aggregations  in this paper.) I can also understand  why a company 
aggregation,  which would be in some ways a more interesting  way of 
summarizing  the data, might  not be possible because of confidentiality 
problems.  But we can at least wish and hope. And certainly  we should 
know more  about  just exactly how the "national  identities"  of multina- 
tional  companies  are established. 
Some very interesting  data manipulation  goes into the breakdown 
and adjustment  of the key variables  for engineering  hours. Most of the 
authors' adjustments  of directly observed engineering  hours seem to 
involve an assumption,  which may or may not be true, that non-parts- 
specific  engineering  hours,  engineering  coordination  or overhead  hours, 
are not conditioned  by the mix of parts-specific  hours. An alternative 
and  better  research  strategy  might  be to avoid these potentially  contro- 
versial adjustments.  Rather than spend so much time analyzing the 
adjusted data (which usually incorporate some arbitrarily  assigned 
unitary  coefficients),  perhaps  it would  be better  to concentrate  on simply 
explaining  the directly observed engineering  hours, broken down be- 
tween directly observed, parts-specific  internal  hours and non-parts- 
specific  hours. 
All this also leads into questions  of model specification.  The authors 
use two dependent  variables:  engineering  hours,  adjusted  apparently  for 
nonunique  and externally  supplied  parts, and lead time. A better alter- 
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able: the parts-specific  internal engineering  hours, non-parts-specific 
engineering  hours,  and  lead  time.  It  would  then  seem  at  least  conceptually 
possible-in  fact the authors  acknowledge  this and have a separate  ad 
hoc bivariate  study at the end of the paper exploring  the matter-that 
the proper  structure  is simultaneous  or recursive, and thus a bit more 
complicated  than  the simple  unidirectional  regressions  used in  the paper. 
For example, N,  general engineering hours, taken as a separate 
dependent  variable,  would seem sensibly specified as a function of all 
the other  engineering  hours, whether  inside or outside. In fact, it would 
be interesting  to see what relative weights might be in terms of how 
many  general  engineering  hours  are needed  as the parts-specific  activity 
is divided  differently  between inside  and  outside sources. 
Internal  parts-specific  engineering  hours-of  which, again, the au- 
thors have direct  observations-might be hypothesized  to be a function 
of all kinds of variables,  perhaps  many  of them not now included  in the 
study. For example, a target-development  period  might  make an inter- 
esting explanatory  variable.  The actual  lead time itself might  make still 
another. Past company  practice, as represented  by lagged engineering 
hours of employment,  might  also be of interest. My guess is, too, that 
degree of company vertical integration  might condition engineering 
practices  and  needs. Therefore,  General  Motors  might  be rather  different 
in its engineering  practices from Chrysler  and Ford because of well- 
known  differences  in supplier  relationships  and practices. 
The omission of a model-year  variable is also rather strange. The 
Japanese cases are concentrated  in the 1980-85 period. All the U.S. 
cases come from 1984-87, while the European  cases span the whole 
period. There could be some problems  interpreting  a model-year  varia- 
ble, but it would be intriguing  and it might  have some effect (providing 
needed control of some irrelevant  extraneous  effects, if nothing  else). 
For example, perhaps  the earlier  the model year, all else equal, the less 
complex new models might  be, with  fewer attendant  engineering  needs. 
The third  dependent  variable,  lead time, might  be a function  of, and 
respond differently  to, different  categories of engineering-hour  inputs, 
such as inside  or outside  parts-specific.  Again,  model  year  might  have an 
effect. One  could  also hypothesize  that  the  different  lead  times, projected 
or realized, could have some interesting  interdependencies  with both 
general engineering-hour  and internal,  parts-specific  engineering-hour 
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In short, there are many reasons for suspecting that the structural 
specification of  these models could be  improved. Certainly, some 
experimentation  with alternatives  seem  justifiable. 
Let me conclude with a few comments on alternative  hypotheses. 
The  authors'  basic  hypothesis  is that  the best Japanese  firms  can develop 
a vehicle of competitive quality in much less  time and with fewer 
engineering  resources than their American  or European  competitors. 
The authors  reject,  and  justly so, two obvious  alternatives.  They quickly 
and  thoroughly  dispose of the possibility  that  differences  in engineering 
capital  equipment,  particularly  CAD/CAE, might explain the superior 
Japanese  performance.  They have an even easier time eliminating  the 
hypothesis  that  the  Japanese  get  by with  fewer  engineering  hours  because 
they have lower-quality  and  less manufacturable  products.  There  is a lot 
of direct  evidence refuting  both hypotheses, as the authors  note. If, by 
the way, they had run  their regressions  with the three Japanese  micro- 
minis out of the sample, their results probably  would have been even 
more conclusive and would have made rejection of these alternative 
quality  and  manufacturability  hypotheses even more straightforward. 
Another  alternative  hypothesis is, however, not so easily dismissed. 
The starting  points  from  which  engineering  adaptations  took place might 
be very different  for the three groups of manufacturers.  In the early 
1970s,  U. S. companies  started  with  heavy, rear-wheel-drive  fuel  guzzlers 
that need considerable  adaptation  to meet the needs of the late 1980s. 
By contrast  the Japanese  started  with light, fuel-efficient  vehicles in the 
early 1970s.  The standard  family sedan that now seems to be emerging 
internationally  almost surely bears more resemblance  to Japanese  cars 
of the early 1970s  than  to the typical  American  or even European  cars  of 
those years. Some of the authors' variables, such as the carryover  in 
unique  parts, might  measure  this. Still, there are a lot of dimensions  to 
uniqueness  and to parts and to carryover qualities that might not be 
captured  very well in their model. A better measure  of some of these 
effects might  be the percentage  of non-parts-specific  engineering  hours 
in total internal  engineering  hours. If manufacturers  had to undertake 
more  changes  and effectuate  more  overall  adaptation  in their  products, 
they might  have needed more coordinating  and overhead engineering 
hours. It is thus at least highly suggestive that these hours apparently 
constitute  a much  higher  percentage  for American  than  for European  or 
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In sum, this paper  makes a strong  case-plausible,  intriguing,  intui- 
tively appealing.  But that  case is not yet fully proved. Better model and 
data  specifications  would  be helpful  steps in  facilitating  further  progress. 
F. M. Scherer: This paper  yields fascinating  results and comes from a 
research effort of impressive scale-the  sort of thing that can only be 
done with the Harvard  Business School's vast resources. It recalls an 
analogous study a quarter  century ago, when several of us at Harvard 
studied  the  cost and  schedule  performance  of advanced  weapons  systems 
research  and  development  programs. 
In a sense the results are remarkably  similar. Dredging  up my old 
records, I regressed  the cost overrun  factors  for eleven weapons devel- 
opment programs  on an index of relative technical difficulty,  which is 
analogous  to the authors'  product  complexity  variables.  Emulating  their 
procedure, I then regressed the residuals from that regression on a 
variable  measuring  the degree to which the actual R&D time schedule 
departed  from the schedule originally  planned. The simple correlation 
coefficients ranged between .64 and .67, depending on whether the 
analysis was linear  or logarithmic.  Kim Clark  and his colleagues find a 
correlation  of .69 between engineering  hours and lead time. They draw 
almost the same inference  from their results as Merton  Peck and I did: 
if schedules are kept under control, cost overruns also tend to be 
restrained.  i 
As the authors  recognize, these results do not refute the notion of a 
time-cost  trade-off.  Rather,  the results  suggest  that  it is a ceteris paribus 
relationship,  and  the "other  things"  are  undoubtedly  much  more  impor- 
tant  to project  outcomes  than  movements  along  the curve. Organization 
appears to matter, and so also may interorganizational  differences in 
efficiency. 
Why should such large differences in the quality-adjusted  cost of 
product  development  exist and  persist  among  manufacturers  in different 
countries?  And  why  don't  all  companies  adopt  the use of a strong  product 
manager  for organizing  development efforts, since such an approach 
seems to be a successful  strategy?  The  advantages  of the project  manager 
1.  Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer,  The Weapons Acqiisition  Process:  Anl 
Economic  Analysis,  vol. 1  (Harvard  University,  Graduate  School  of Business  Administra- 
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in complex  developments  were well known and widely touted twenty- 
five years ago, when Peck and I did our research on weapons  develop- 
ment.  Clark and his colleagues  have  not provided  clear answers,  nor 
can I. I do, however,  have some hypotheses. 
First, inefficient development organizations survive because they are 
not  subjected  to  strong  market tests.  They  do  not  sell  products  in 
competititon  with other groups.  Instead,  they transfer complex,  ever- 
changing  services  internally  within  a  large  organization.  From  the 
authors' analysis of the payoffs attributable to completing  a car devel- 
opment four months ahead of schedule,  it would appear that the quasi- 
rents generated by those services  far exceed  the costs,  so development 
activities,  too,  are  not  subjected  to  a  tough  internal  test  when  the 
question is asked, "Is this activity worth doing?" 
Parkinson's first law is especially  applicable in engineering develop- 
ment organizations.  One of the lessons  I absorbed during the Harvard 
weapons  project was that if one employs  an engineer and tells him to 
engineer, he will find things to do, whether they are needed or not. His 
output in turn becomes  input for other engineers.  Yet we saw weapons 
development  groups in which the law did not hold. They were almost 
uniformly organizations that for one reason or another had more projects 
than they could accommodate,  leading me to generalize: 
Under conditions of high opportunity  cost, firms have a kind of automatic 
contractual incentive for efficiency....  That is, if a firm with high opportunity 
costs uses fewer scientists,  engineers, project managers, and skilled production 
workers on one development  contract,  it can employ  those  persons  to obtain 
and  execute other  development  contracts  which  yield additional  profit....2 
I have always believed this was one of the most important lessons  taught 
by our research. Failure to heed it and to load good defense contractors 
heavily is a major reason why  weapons  programs cost  so  much.  The 
authors here suggest some support for the generalization by noting that 
in Japan, chronic shortages of engineers placed sharp limits on speciali- 
zation while competition motivated efficient use of engineers. 
Parkinsonian tendencies  toward overstaffing may be especially  prev- 
alent in very  large,  mature parent organizations.  Here  too,  there  is 
outside supporting evidence.  Arnold Cooper conducted a smaller-scale 
2.  Frederic M.  Scherer,  The Weapons Acqluisition Process:  Economic  Incentives, 
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study  similar  to that  of the authors  .3 Investigating  products  that  had  been 
developed independently  and almost simultaneously  in two firms, one 
large  and  one small,  he found  that  the large  firm  spent  from  three  to eight 
times more to develop essentially identical  products. From interviews 
he inferred  that the small firm  was more efficient  because it was more 
cost-conscious, enjoyed closer communication  among both R&D and 
production  staff,  employed  better-quality  people, and  had  an  atmosphere 
generally  more  conducive  to efficient  production. 
One  thing  the authors  do not tell us is whether  there might  have been 
discernible  quality  differences  among  the staffs employed  in the various 
auto  companies.  It is said  that  the U.S. defense-space  effort  has drained 
away the top engineering  talent from industries such as automobiles. 
Could  this help explain  the high  cost of U.S. engineering  efforts? 
Motivation  may also matter.  David Halberstam  revealed  extreme  de- 
moralization  among  product  engineers  in U.S. auto companies  as their 
technically advanced proposals were repeatedly rejected by finance- 
oriented executives.4 In Japan, more prestige attaches to technical 
virtuosity.  Could  this be part  of the explanation? 
Why  strong  project  managers  were not employed  might  have  a similar 
rationale.  My observation  suggests that  organizational  structures  adapt 
to the strengths  and  weaknesses of the people at hand  and  do not simply 
follow lines drawn  arbitrarily  on organization  charts. Did the U.S. and 
European  auto companies  lack strong  individuals  to emerge as project 
managers  and  product  champions?  Or  was there  something  in  the  internal 
organizational  politics  that  discouraged  granting  substantial  authority  to 
middle-level managers?  Or did top management  simply believe that 
functional organization  permits fuller staff utilization at slack times 
(probably  true)  and  therefore  that  the  functional  approach  was less costly 
(a probable  non sequitur)? 
Finally, a technical note. The method used by the authors  to adjust 
their  raw data on engineering  hours  for work contracted  outside seems 
intrinsically  plausible. However, some results from my study of U.S. 
R&D and patenting suggest a caveat. In automobile assembly, 0.28 
invention patents were obtained per $1 million of 1974  R&D; in auto 
3. Arnold  C. Cooper,  "R&D  Is More  Efficient  in  Small  Companies,"  Harv,ardBusiness 
Review,  vol. 42 (May-June  1964),  pp. 75-83. 
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parts, 4.35 patents were obtained.5  Clearly, the partsmakers'  work is 
more  inventive  in the conventional  sense. Could  this  mean  that  relatively 
more  weight  should  be given to work  that is contracted  out? Or  alterna- 
tively, could the higher  outside invention  rate per unit  of input, demon- 
strating  greater  partsmaker  efficiency, imply an adjustment  less than 
proportional  to physical  task assignment  levels? 
The research  presented  in this paper  is an impressive  first  step. I hope 
its continuation  will provide  answers  to some of the questions  I raise as 
well as to the many  other questions  that will undoubtedly  emerge  in the 
discussion. 
General Discussion 
Kim Clark  agreed  with John Meyer's point that the starting  position 
and the historical  experiences of the individual  firms  are important  in 
explaining  their  different  organizational  styles and  performances,  noting 
that  the historical  prevalence  of functional  organizations  in Europe  and 
the United States may have to do with the fact that  functional  organiza- 
tions are easier  to manage. 
With regard  to starting  point, Timothy  Bresnahan  noted that all the 
projects  studied  were begun  during  or  just after  the second oil shock in 
the late 1970s. At that time U.S.  firms were just beginning to gain 
experience in designing small, fuel-efficient  cars, while Japanese and 
European  firms were starting  projects after a long history of building 
small  cars. Hence it may be inappropriate  to give the "Japanese  effect" 
a structural  interpretation.  Clark  responded  that the selection process 
used for the projects should have controlled for some of the effects 
Bresnahan  was concerned  about. Every project  studied,  he said, was at 
least one generation  removed from the first major  new model line that 
represented  a response to oil price increases, and in most cases the 
projects  were two or three  generations  removed. 
Edwin Mansfield pointed out that the industrial context is  also 
important.  In a comparative  study  of cost and  time required  for product 
imitation  by Japanese and U.S. companies, he found that the perfor- 
5. F. M. Scherer,  "The Propensity  To Patent,"  International  Journal  of Industrial 
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mance  advantage  of Japanese  firms  was particularly  strong  in  machinery, 
electrical  equipment,  and  instruments  industries,  but  negligible  in chem- 
icals and drugs. Moreover, the Japanese advantage was greater in 
innovations  that  represented  relatively  modest  adaptations  and  improve- 
ments rather than major innovations based on internally developed 
technologies. On these counts, the innovations studied in this paper 
happened to be ones in which the Japanese tend to excel.  Hence, 
Mansfield  cautioned  that  it would  be a mistake  to generalize  too broadly 
from  the authors'  findings. 
George Eads observed that General  Motors had used a small-team 
organizational  form  similar  to the authors'  heavyweight  structure  in the 
1950s  to develop several of GM's more successful product  lines, and 
that the company  was again  moving  in that direction.  Thus, GM's own 
experience  gave credence  to the authors'  results. F. M. Scherer  pointed 
out that  the nature  of the interaction  between development  and  produc- 
tion  teams  was  an  important  consideration  in  the choice of organizational 
structure.  For example, he noted, the heavyweight  team structure  was 
similar  to "skunk works" used to develop military  systems and hard- 
ware. The success of such an approach  depends on the existence of a 
highly skilled production staff that can work with less-than-perfect 
designs. 
Clark  agreed  that this interaction  is critical, but noted that in many 
instances  the U.S. and European  firms  used some of the same suppliers 
of dies and  other  tooling  that  the Japanese  used. Even when the highest 
level of production  skill was available  to the U.S. and European  firms, 
however, their  internal  style of operations  seemed to inhibit  them from 
exploiting  it. Instead, the Japanese  suppliers  adapted  to the American 
model. Bruce  Chew  noted that  the Japanese  projects  were placing  more 
complete designs, with fewer errors, in the hands of their production 
people. 
Thomas  Kochan  also took issue with  the notion  that  lack of skill  at the 
production  phase  would  tend  to cause U.S. firms  to overdesign.  Instead, 
he blamed overspecialization and overly rigid work organizations. 
Opening  up the production  process might  enable the production  work 
force to solve more  problems  on its own, which would have benefits  in 
the design  phase. People's skills  are embedded  in the structure  in which 
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Eads observed  that  the kind  and  form  of the information  being  passed 
between various  parties  in a project  affect the extent to which activities 
can be overlapped.  Simultaneous  engineering,  for  example,  is facilitated 
by use of computer-aided  design and mathematical  modeling, since all 
the parties working  on a project can have access to the most current 
model  as their  point  of reference. 
Clifford  Winston  raised a question about the appropriateness  of the 
authors'  implied  structural  model in which the price of the automobiles 
was an explanatory  variable determining  engineering  hours. He sug- 
gested that both variables should be simultaneously  determined  and 
endogenous.  Clark  agreed  that this was a problem,  noting  that a major 
part  of the analytical  problem  facing the researchers  involved deciding 
what variables  should be regarded  as measures  of outcome and which 
ones were under the control of the firm and should be regarded  as 
decision variables.  Martin  Baily wondered  why the organizational  dif- 
ferences persisted if some strategies  had been so clearly shown to be 
effective and questioned whether the differences were themselves a 
function of variables such as firm size and market structure. Chew 
responded  that the authors  had looked at these variables,  which econo- 
mists have traditionally  used to explain differences in performance 
between  firms,  but  found  that  they were not very powerful  in explaining 
what  was going  on. Clark  added  that  the project  represented  an attempt 
to get inside the black  box of the firm,  as economists traditionally  view 
it. Their results, he concluded, are evidence that internal  differences 
between firms  are important,  and they raise questions about why they 
exist, where  they come from, and  why they persist. 